

Exorcising Spectres with Secure Compilers

(wip)



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Talk Outline

Spectre v1 

Slides courtesy of M.G.

Foundations of Secure Compilation

Exorcism via RSC

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Speculative execution + branch prediction

Size of array **A**

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Prediction based on **branch history** & **program structure**



Branch predictor

Wrong prediction? **Rollback changes!**



Architectural (ISA) state




Microarchitectural state

Spectre V1

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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Spectre V1





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



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


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


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


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


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
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
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Persistent across
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
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1) Training  f(0);f(1);f(2); ...

2) Prepare cache

3) Run with $x = 128$

4) Extract from cache

Compiler-level countermeasures

Compiler-level countermeasures

For *Spectre V1*

Injecting speculation barriers

```
if (x < A_size)
    y = B[A[x]]
```



```
if (x < A_size)
    lfence
    y = B[A[x]]
```

- In x86, **LFENCE** act as **speculation barrier**
- Compiler injects LFENCE after each branch instruction
 - Microsoft Visual C++
 - Intel ICC
- Effectively **stop speculative execution!**

Speculative load-hardening (SLH)

```
if (x < A_size)
    y = B[A[x]]
```



```
if (x < A_size)
    y = B[mask(A[x])]
```

- Injects *data dependencies* and *masking operations*
- Combines *conditional moves* and *binary operations*
- Stops *speculative leaks*
- Does not block speculative execution!
- Implemented in Clang

Foundations of Secure Compilation

Secure Compilation Goals

ChaCha20

Poly1305

...

F^*

HACL*: ... CCS'17

Asm

[[ChaCha20]]

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
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160x C/C++ code

Secure Compilation Goals

Preserve the security of



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when interoperating with

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Secure Compilation Goals

Correct compilation

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Poly1305

...

F^*

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[[ChaCha20]]

[[Poly1305]]

[[...]]

Secure Compilation Goals

Secure compilation

ChaCha20

Poly1305

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F^*

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Secure Compilation Goals

Enable source-level security reasoning

ChaCha20

Poly1305

...

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HACL*: ... CCS'17

Asm


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
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Robust Compilation Criteria “Journey Beyond Full Abstraction...” CSF’19



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Exorcism via RSC

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4. adapt RSC to preserve SS : RSSC
5. prove the compilers attain RSSC

Goal Up Next

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Speculative Semantics 101 “Spectector ...” S&P’20

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call f 128

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
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
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
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
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
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
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rdA[128]

rdB[3]

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
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
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
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
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
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$rdA[128] : S$

$rdB[3] : U$

SS-Preserving Compiler: RSSC & RSSP

$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{RSSP} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \forall A.A [P] : SS \text{ then } \forall A.A [\llbracket P \rrbracket] : SS$

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$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{RSSC} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \forall A.A [\llbracket P \rrbracket] \rightsquigarrow t \text{ then } \exists A.A [P] \rightsquigarrow t \approx t$

$\approx =$ same traces, plus **S** actions in t

SS -Preserving Compiler: RSSC & RSSP

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$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{RSSC} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \forall A.A [\llbracket P \rrbracket] \rightsquigarrow t \text{ then } \exists A.A [P] \rightsquigarrow t \approx t$

$\approx =$ same traces, plus **S** actions in t

- RSSC & RSSP are equivalent

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$\approx =$ same traces, plus **S** actions in **t**

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- lfence : RSSC because it has no speculation (**pc**: **S** always)
- SLH : RSSC because masking taints as **S**

RSSC **for** lfence


```
void f(int x) ↦ if(x < A.size){y = B[A[x]]} // A.size=16, A[128]=3  
[[·]] = void f(int x) ↦ if(x < A.size){lfence; y = B[A[x]]}
```

call f 128

pc: 5


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
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
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RSSC **for** SLH

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pc : S

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


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
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
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
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
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
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`rd B[0] : S`

Questions?

