GPS: Navigating Weak Memory with Ghosts, Protocols, and Separation

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Abstract
Weak memory models formalize the inconsistent behaviors that one can expect to observe in multithreaded programs running on modern hardware. In so doing, however, they complicate the already-difficult task of reasoning about correctness of concurrent code. Worse, they render impotent the sophisticated formal methods that have been developed to tame concurrency, which almost universally assume a strong (i.e., sequentially consistent) memory model.

This paper introduces GPS, the first program logic to provide a full-fledged suite of modern verification techniques—including ghost state, protocols, and separation logic—for high-level, structured reasoning about weak memory. We demonstrate the effectiveness of GPS by applying it to challenging examples drawn from the Linux kernel as well as lock-free data structures. We also define the semantics of GPS and prove in Coq that it is sound with respect to the axiomatic C11 weak memory model.

Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming Languages]: Formal Definitions and Theory; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs

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1. Introduction
When reasoning about the behavior of a multithreaded program, what can we assume about the interactions between concurrent threads and the shared memory they operate on? In the vast majority of the research on concurrent program verification, it is assumed that shared memory accesses are sequentially consistent (SC)—i.e., there is a single global RAM, threads take turns interacting with it, and any memory update performed by one thread is immediately visible to all other threads. Even assuming sequential consistency, concurrent program verification is a highly challenging problem, since one must account for the myriad interleavings of threads. But fortunately there has been tremendous progress in recent years on advanced program logics and verification tools to help tame the complexity of interleaved execution [9, 11, 13, 15, 24, 29, 30, 36, 37, 39].

Unfortunately, the assumption of sequential consistency is unrealistically “strong”: the synchronization required to implement it on modern architectures precludes useful compiler optimizations that reorder memory operations, and is thus considered by many to be too expensive in general [6]. Instead, languages like C/C++ [20, 21] and Java [26] support weak (or relaxed) models of memory, in which different threads may observe operations on shared memory occurring in different orders. To characterize precisely what types of inconsistent observations are permitted, these language-level memory models eschew the fiction of a single global RAM and an interleaving semantics; rather, they model valid program executions using event graphs, which track dependencies between memory accesses subject to a variety of consistency axioms, e.g., “if this event is visible to a thread t, then so are these other events.”

In short, weak memory models are useful in enabling compilers and hardware to aggressively optimize memory accesses, but they also invalidate the basic assumptions underlying existing verification tools and complicate the semantics of concurrent code. As such, they have led to a serious gap between the theory and practice of concurrency.

This paper takes a substantial step toward closing that gap by presenting the first concurrent program logic that is sound under weak memory assumptions but also supports a full suite of modern verification techniques: ghost state, protocols, and separation (GPS). Below, we briefly explain why these techniques have proven important in reasoning under strong memory assumptions (§1.1) and the obstacles we face in adapting them to weak memory (§1.2), before describing our contributions in more detail (§1.3).
1.1 Concurrent program logics: the state of the art

The goal of most program logics is to prove “deep” correctness properties of code, and to do so in a modular fashion, whereby different components of a program can be verified in isolation, given only logical specifications (specs) of the other components. Modern logics for SC concurrency meet this goal through a variety of mechanisms—among the most widespread and effective are the following:

Ownership and separation. Concurrent programs are often inherently modular in the sense that different threads within a program control (or “own”) disjoint pieces of the program state. This modularity is important for simplifying verification: if a thread owns a piece of state, one should be able to verify the thread’s manipulations of that state without worrying about interference from other threads. Modern logics encapsulate this kind of reasoning through the mechanisms of ownership and separation.

Consider, for instance, the parallel composition rule of concurrent separation logic (CSL) [30]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{P_1\} e_1 \{Q_1\} & \quad \{P_2\} e_2 \{Q_2\} \\
\{P_1 \land P_2\} & \quad e_1 \quad \{Q_1 \land Q_2\}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \(P_i\) and \(Q_i\) not only describe the facts that hold before and after the execution of thread \(e_i\), they also characterize the piece of the program state that \(e_i\) “owns”. The rule thus says that \(e_1\) and \(e_2\) may be safely run in parallel—without any interference checking—so long as \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) describe disjoint pieces of state, as enforced implicitly by the use of the “separating conjunction” \(P_1 \land P_2\) in the precondition.

Protocols. Separation lets one dispense with interference implicitly when threads do not in fact interfere. But sometimes explicit reasoning about interference is unavoidable, e.g., when reasoning about race (lock-free) data structures. In such cases, the most basic mechanism for restoring modular reasoning is the invariant, which describes a property holding of a piece of shared state at all times. With an invariant installed, different threads can be verified modularly so long as they all respect the invariant.

More generally, since invariants can be overly restrictive, modern logics support various forms of protocols for legislating interference. The best-known protocol logic is rely-guarantee [23], which describes the state transitions a thread may perform (the guarantee) vs. those its environment may perform (the rely). Recent protocol mechanisms improve upon rely-guarantee by supporting more abstract/concise forms of shared state transition systems [37].

Ghost state. Last but not least, ghost (or auxiliary) state refers generally to any behavior-preserving instrumentation of a program (or its proof) with additional “logical” state for the purposes of verification. Ghost state is often used to expose control flow, or to summarize execution history, in a way that could not be done just in terms of the “physical” state manipulated by the program. Furthermore, it is essential for the completeness of basic concurrency logics.

In newer logics, ghost state, protocols, and separation are used in tandem to great effect. For example, ghost state can be used to encode logical “permissions” (or “tokens”), which are ownable resources that control the ability to make certain transitions in shared state protocols. Ownership of permissions can then be transferred back and forth between threads via the same shared protocols, in turn providing a way to model the dynamic “role-playing” that occurs in realistic concurrent code. Logics such as RGSep [39], LRG [16], Deny-Guarantee [15], VCC [9], Chalice [24], CAP [13], CaReSL [37], FCSL [29], iCAP [36], and TaDA [11] depend on such a synthesis of ghost state, protocols, and separation.

1.2 Obstacles to modular weak memory reasoning

While the aforementioned mechanisms provide powerful, modular reasoning about concurrency, there are serious obstacles to adapting them to weak memory models like those of C/C++ or Java:

Separation obstacles. Models of concurrent separation logics have generally assumed the existence of a single global RAM (pieces of which may be owned by different threads) and a single global notion of “time” (based on an interleaving semantics). However, in weak memory models based on event graphs, there is no clear global notion of a heap or of time, making it unclear how to model basic notions like Hoare triples and separation.

Protocol obstacles. Most logics support protocols that govern multiple memory locations simultaneously, connecting the value of one location to another. But even this simple mechanism is unsound for weak memory: updates to different locations may appear in contradictory orders to different threads, so a thread can appear to be following the protocol from its own point of view while violating it from the point of view of other threads.

Ghost state obstacles. Traditional ghost state is incorporated by introducing explicit reads and writes to a program text, with the constraint that these operations must not change the code’s observable behavior. But in weak memory models it is not clear how to usefully incorporate such reads and writes without also introducing events and ordering into the event graph that ultimately affect the program’s behavior.

An important first step toward overcoming these obstacles is the recent work of Vafeiadis and Narayanan on Relaxed Separation Logic (RSL) [38], the first logic for the C11 memory model. RSL supports simple, high-level reasoning about resource invariants and ownership transfer à la concurrent separation logic (CSL) [30]—a particularly simple combination of protocols and separation. But RSL provides no support for ghost state or for more complex forms of protocol (e.g., rely-guarantee) or ownership transfer.

1.3 This paper

In this paper, we present GPS, the first logic to support ghost state, protocols and separation in a weak memory setting.
GPS builds on the groundwork laid by RSL, extending and generalizing it in several useful ways:

- **Protocols.** GPS supports per-location (PL) protocols, which are modeled after the protocols in recent concurrency logics but restricted in order to be sound under weak memory. The key to regaining soundness is to insist that a protocol may only precisely dictate the evolution of a single shared memory location, although it may make bounded assertions about the state of other memory locations, e.g., “x’s value may only grow over time, and when x contains n, y must contain at least n as well.”

- **Ghost state.** The states of PL-protocols already constitute a useful form of ghost state for summarizing, e.g., the history of an execution. To support ownable logical resources (e.g., permissions), GPS offers an additional facility called ghosts. Ghosts enable one to create and manipulate whatever kind of logical resource one needs for a particular verification, so long as it can be formulated as a partial commutative monoid [14, 22, 25].

- **Ownership transfer.** In prior SC logics, threads can transfer ownership of resources to other threads through the medium of a shared protocol. GPS’s PL-protocols also support ownership transfer between threads, but for soundness purposes it is somewhat restricted: the acquiring thread must perform an explicit synchronization operation like CAS in order to ensure that it is the exclusive recipient of the transfer. To facilitate ownership transfer even when the threads use only plain reads and writes, we introduce an additional mechanism called escrows.

We demonstrate the use of the above logical features through a series of concrete motivating examples in §3.

GPS targets the recent C11 [20, 21] memory model, which offers portable but fine-grained control over memory consistency guarantees. GPS supports verification of programs that use the three most important consistency modes for C11: nonatomic, release-acquire and sequentially-consistent (see §2). Since sequentially-consistent reasoning is relatively well understood, the paper presents the details only for the first two modes (but see §6 for further discussion of the SC mode). It is nonetheless worth stressing that verifications in GPS hold good under the full axioms of the C11 model (and thus for any compliant compiler). Moreover, the entire logic, model and soundness proof of GPS have been formalized in Coq [1].

For space reasons, we focus in this paper almost entirely on the proof theory of GPS; §3.7 sketches some details of the semantic model and soundness proof, but for full details we refer the reader to the appendix and Coq development.

To evaluate GPS, we have applied it to several challenging case studies drawn from the Linux kernel and lock-free data structures, as we describe in §4. These examples extend the reach of existing program logics: we know of no other logic that can verify them under C11’s weak memory assumptions. We conclude in §5 and §6 with related and future work.

## 2. The C11 memory model

Memory models answer a seemingly simple question: when a thread reads from a location, what values can it encounter?

- Sequential consistency (SC) provides an equally simple answer: threads read the last value written. SC is based on interleaving, where threads interact atomically through a global heap holding each location’s current value.

- In weaker consistency models, the “last value written” to a location plays no special role—it may not even be well-defined. Instead, threads can read out-of-date values due to CPU or compiler optimizations.

The C11 memory model [20, 21] strikes a careful balance between these extremes by offering a menu of consistency levels. Broadly, memory operations are classified as either nonatomic (the default) or atomic. Nonatomic accesses are intended for “normal data”, while atomic accesses are used for synchronization.

Nonatomics are governed by a peculiar contract: the programmer can assume them to be SC, but must (under this assumption!) never create a data race—roughly, a thread must never write nonatomically if another thread might access the same location concurrently. This rule prevents the program from observing compiler/CPU optimizations on nonatomics.

Atomics offer the opposite tradeoff: concurrent threads may race to e.g., update a location atomically, but the memory model provides weaker guarantees (and admits fewer optimizations) for atomic accesses in general. The precise guarantees are determined by an “ordering annotation”, ranging from SC to fully relaxed. In this paper, we focus on the release-acquire ordering, which is the primary building block for non-SC synchronization. As such, we will use two ordering annotations, \( O \in \{ \text{at}, \text{na} \} \), for atomic (release-acquire) and nonatomic accesses, respectively. The full version of the memory model and GPS logic, as formalized in Coq [1], also includes sequentially-consistent accesses.

### Examples

Before introducing C11 formally, we build some intuition through two classic examples. The first is a simplified version of Dekker’s algorithm, which provided the first solution to the mutual-exclusion problem [12]:

\[
\begin{align*}
\left[ x \right]_{\text{at}} & := 1 \\
\text{if } \left[ y \right]_{\text{at}} == 0 \text{ then } & \left[ y \right]_{\text{at}} := 1 \\
\text{/* crit. section */} & \left[ x \right]_{\text{at}} == 0 \text{ then } \left[ x \right]_{\text{at}} := 1 \\
\text{/* crit. section */}
\end{align*}
\]

We presume at the outset that \( x \) and \( y \) are pointers to distinct locations, both with initial value 0.\(^1\) The two threads race to announce their intent to enter a critical section; each thread then checks whether it announced first. In this simplified version, even under SC, it is possible for both threads to lose. Unfortunately, in the C11 model, it is also possible for both threads to win! The intuition is that C11 allows the reads to

\(^1\) We are using here the program logic notation for pointer dereferencing, \([-]\), which avoids ambiguity with the * of separation logic.
be performed before the writes have become visible to all threads; the two threads can read stale values.

The second example illustrates a case where C11 atomics do enforce some ordering. The goal is to pass a “message” (in this case, just a single value, $37$, but more generally a data structure) from one thread to another:

\[
\begin{align*}
x & := x_0; \\
y & := y_0; \\
[&\text{repeat}] y := y; \\
&\text{end} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Again, we presume $x$ and $y$ are pointers to distinct locations, initially $0$. The repeat construct executes an expression repeatedly until its value is nonzero, so the second thread will “spin” until it sees the write to $y$ by the first thread. Unlike in Dekker’s algorithm, here C11 will guarantee that the subsequent read from $x$ will return $37$. The key difference is that reading $1$ from $y$ yields positive information about what the first thread has done: if an atomic (release) write by a given thread is seen by another thread, so is everything that “happened before” the write, including all the writes that appear prior to it in the thread’s code. Dekker’s algorithm, by contrast, draws conclusions from not seeing a write by another thread.

In general, then, release-acquire in C11 doesn’t guarantee that threads see the “globally-latest” write to a location, but does guarantee that (1) if a thread sees a particular write, it also sees everything that happened before it, and (2) of the writes a thread sees for a location, it reads from the latest.

A final point about the code: its use of $y$ guarantees that the write to $y$ by the first thread happens before—not concurrently with—the read of $x$ by the second thread. So the code is data-race free, despite nonatomic accesses to $x$.

**Event graphs** We now present the C11 model formally, following Batty et al. [3] and subsequent simplifications [4, 38]. Our presentation makes some further simplifications due to our focus on release-acquire atomics, but GPS is sound for reasoning about non-atomic, release-acquire and SC accesses under the official C11 axioms. Reasoning about more advanced features of the C11 model—namely, relaxed and consume atomics—is left as future work and discussed in §6.

Since weak memory models allow threads to see stale values, they must track the history of an execution and use it to specify the values a read can return. The C11 model takes the axiomatic approach: it treats each step of a program execution as a node in a graph, and then constrains the graph through a collection of global axioms on several kinds of edges. Each node is labeled with an action:

\[
\alpha ::= \text{skip} | k(\ell, \ell', a) | k(\ell, V, O) | \text{read}(\ell, V, O) | \text{write}(\ell, V, O) | \text{update}(\ell, V)
\]

where $O \in \{\text{na}, \text{at}\}$. The actions are Skip (no memory interaction), Allocate, Read, Write, and atomic Update. Reads and writes record the location, value read/written, and ordering annotation. An atomic update $\text{update}(\ell, V, O)$ simultaneously reads the value $V_\ell$ from location $\ell$ and updates it with the new value $V_n$ (used for e.g., compare-and-set).

We assume an infinite set of event IDs; an action map $A$ is then a finite partial map from event IDs to actions, which defines the nodes (and node labels) of a graph. An event graph $G = (A, \text{sb}, \text{mo}, \text{rf})$ connects the nodes with three kinds of directed edges:

- **Sequenced-before** ($\text{sb} \subseteq \text{dom}(A) \times \text{dom}(A)$), which records the order of events as they appear in the code (i.e., “program order”). For convenience, $\text{sb}$ is not transitive: it relates each node only to its immediate successors in program order (see [38]).

- **Modification order** ($\text{mo} \subseteq \text{dom}(A) \times \text{dom}(A)$), which is a strict, total order on all the writes to each location, but does not relate writes to different locations. It determines which of any pair of (possibly concurrent) writes to a location is considered to “take effect” first—a determination that is agreed upon globally.

- **Reads-from** ($\text{rf} \in \text{dom}(A) \rightarrow \text{dom}(A)$), which maps each read to the unique write, if any, that it is reading from. It is undefined for reads from uninitialized locations.

The goal of the C11 axioms is to constrain the rf relation so that it provides the guarantees mentioned informally above. The axioms rely on a pair of derived relations:

- **Synchronized-with** ($\text{sw} \subseteq \text{dom}(A) \times \text{dom}(A)$) defines those read-write pairs that induce “transitive visibility”, as in
the message-passing example above. In the release-acquire fragment of C11, these include any read/write pair marked as atomic:

\[
sw \triangleq \{(a, b) \mid rf(b) = a, \text{isAtomic}(a), \text{isAtomic}(b)\}
\]

**Happens-before** (hb \(\triangleq (sb \cup sw)^+\)) is the heart of the model: hb\((a, b)\) means that if a thread has observed event \(b\), then it has observed event \(a\) as well; it bounds staleness.

**Axioms** Only the sb order is determined by the program as written. The other orders are chosen arbitrarily—except that they must satisfy C11’s axioms. These axioms include some sanity checks:

- hb is acyclic (an event cannot happen before itself),
- a location cannot be allocated more than once,
- rf maps reads to writes of the same location and value, and it is not possible to read a value from a write that happens later:\(^2\)

\[
rf(b) = a \implies \exists \ell, V. \text{writes}(a, \ell, V), \text{reads}(b, \ell, V), \neg\text{hb}(b, a)
\]

- atomic updates must, in fact, be atomic: the update must immediately follow the event it reads from in mo:

\[
\text{isUpd}(e), \quad rf(c) = a \implies \text{mo}(a, c), \neg \exists b. \text{mo}(a, b), \text{mo}(b, c)
\]

But the heavy lifting of the C11 model is done by a final axiom, called coherence, which connects mo, rf, and hb:

\[
\text{hb}(a, b) \implies \neg\text{mo}(a, b), \neg\text{mo}(rf(b), a), \neg\text{mo}(rf(b), rf(a)), \neg\text{mo}(b, rf(a))
\]

To see how coherence formally ensures the intuitive guarantees we gave above, we apply it to the simple message-passing example, this time in graph form:

```
+------------------------+
| a:W(x,0,na)            |
| b:W(x,37,na)           |
| c:W(y,1,at)            |
| d:R(y,1,at)            |
| e:R(x,7,na)            |
|                         |
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+------------------------+
```

(Initialization of \(y\) elided.)

In the depicted execution, the event \(d\) in the second thread reads from the event \(e\) in the first thread (which writes \(1\) to \(y\)). We use coherence to deduce that the subsequent read of \(x\) in event \(e\) must read from event \(b\) (which writes \(37\) to \(x\)):

- Since \(sb(a, b)\), and thus \(hb(a, b)\), we have \(\neg\text{mo}(a, b)\). But mo is a total order on writes to a location, so \(\text{mo}(a, b)\).
- Since \(rf(d) = c\), we have \(sw(c, d)\) and thus \(hb(c, d)\). By transitivity of hb, we have \(hb(b, d)\) and hence \(hb(b, e)\).
- Coherence then says that \(\neg\text{mo}(rf(e), b)\), i.e., that \(e\) cannot read from any write earlier (in mo) than \(b\); in particular, \(e\) cannot read from \(a\). It must read from \(b\).

\(^2\)The reads and writes functions extract the locations and values from normal read/writes as well as atomic updates.

The key is the second step, where we deduce the existence of an sw edge (and thus the transitive visibility, by hb, of previous writes). In Dekker’s algorithm, by contrast, when one thread reads the other’s flag, there are no hb edges that ensure it sees the “latest” write.

We write consistent\(C11(G)\) if a graph \(G\) satisfies the axioms above (plus one more for uninitialized reads).

**A language for C11 concurrency** Figure 1 gives a simple language of expressions \(e\) with allocation, pointer arithmetic, thread forking and order-annotated memory operations. To streamline the semantics, we adopt A-normal form [18], which requires intermediate computations to be named through let-binding (the only evaluation context \(K\)). The if expression takes the then branch when its guard is non-zero. Similarly, repeat executes the given subexpression until it produces a non-zero value, which is returned.

The semantics is given in two layers. First, expressions \(e\) freely generate actions \(a\) through the relation \(\rightarrow a, e\). Pure expressions generate the \(S\) action (e.g., let \(x = V\) in \(e \rightarrow e[V/x]\)), while expressions that interact with memory generate corresponding memory model actions. Note that reading generates an \(R\) action for an arbitrary value. The actual value read is constrained by the second layer, which governs machine configurations \((T; G)\).

Machine configurations track the current pool of threads, \(T\), and the event graph built up so far, \(G\). For each thread, the pool maintains (1) the identity of the last event produced by the thread and (2) an expression giving the thread’s continuation. To take a (non-\text{fork}) step, a thread’s continuation must generate some action \(\alpha\), which is then incorporated into an updated event graph \(G’\), where it is placed in sb order after the thread’s previous event. The mo order for \(G’\) can arbitrarily extend the one for \(G\), but because it is a strict total order on writes, the extension will only add relationships to the new node. The rf order can likewise only add a read for the new node, which must read from some previously-existing write. Finally, the new graph \(G’\) is assumed to satisfy the C11 axioms, constraining both the possible events and edges. The validity of this semantics for C11 is discussed in the appendix [1].

We write \([e]\) for the set of final values \(e\) can produce, starting with a single-node event graph (where the start node is action \(S\)). If at any point \(e\) creates a data race or memory error (defined formally in the appendix), then \([e]\) = err; the C11 semantics leaves such programs undefined. Any expression verified by GPS is guaranteed to be free of data races on non-atomic locations and memory errors.

### 3. GPS

The C11 memory model successfully serves as a contract between compiler and programmer, making it possible—in principle—to resolve disputes (can a read of \(x\) here return 0?) by reference to global axioms. These axioms—again, in principle—also support certain intuitions about, e.g.,
transitive visibility. But, even with an example as simple as one-shot message passing (§2), the intuitions are not directly captured by the axioms. Rather, they emerge through chains of subtle reasoning showing that certain edges must, or must not, exist. Axiomatic reasoning is relentlessly global: a read event can potentially read from any write in the graph, so the axioms must be applied to each write to rule it in or out.

Our goal is to supplement the C11 memory model with a program logic that (1) directly captures intuitions about transitive visibility and (2) supports thread-local reasoning. GPS achieves both goals through

- per-location protocols that abstract away event graphs;
- ghosts and escrows, which govern logical permissions in the style of recent separation logics.

**Setup** GPS is a separation logic for an expression language. Its central judgment is the Hoare triple, \( \{ P \} e \{ Q \} \), which says that when given resources described by \( P \), the expression \( e \) is memory safe and data-race free. If, moreover, \( e \) terminates with a value \( V \), it will do so with resources satisfying \( Q[V/x] \). We will introduce assertions \( P \) gradually. For now, we assume they include the basic operators of multi-sorted first-order logic:

\[
P ::= t = t \mid P \land P \mid P \lor P \mid P \Rightarrow P \mid \forall X.P \mid \exists X.P
\]

where \( t \) ranges over terms. We write \( t : \theta \) if \( t \) has sort \( \theta \), and assume that variables \( X \) are broken into classes by sort. For now, the only sort is \( \text{Val} \), ranged over by variables \( \ell, x, y, z \).

### 3.1 Per-location protocols

We start with a slight variation on the message-passing example from §2:

\[
\begin{align*}
[x]_{at} & := 37; \\
[y]_{at} & := 1; \\
\text{repeat} & [y]_{at} \text{ end};
\end{align*}
\]

In this variant, there are multiple threads sending the same message \((37)\),\(^3\) and intuitively this works for the same reason the original does: transitive visibility. We want to articulate this common intuition in a way that doesn’t depend on how many threads are sending the message \(37\) or involve global reasoning about the event graph.

A tempting starting point is to simply say that the values that \(x\) and \(y\) point to progress from \((0, 0)\) to \((37, 0)\) to \((37, 1)\). In other words, we would like to impose a protocol on the evolution of \(x\) and \(y\). Such protocols are the lifeline of prior SC concurrency logics (see §5.1 for details), but alas, the kind of reasoning they support is unsound for weak memory in general: it assumes that all threads will see writes to different locations in the same order. In actuality, independent (i.e., hb-unrelated) writes to different locations can appear to threads in different orders, which is why Dekker’s algorithm fails. If we want thread-local reasoning, we need an approach that accounts for what our thread may see, while capturing the happens-before relationship between writes.

\(^3\)Note that the writes to \(x\) here must be atomic to avoid data races.

The key insight of GPS is that we can constrain the evolution of values if we focus on one location at a time: mo provides a linear order, seen by all threads, on the writes to a given location. Toward this end, GPS provides per-location protocols, which are state transition systems governing a single shared location. Using protocols, we can express the changes to \(x\) and \(y\) independently:

\[
x : 0 \xrightarrow{37} 37 \xrightarrow{1} y : 0 \xrightarrow{1} 1
\]

These transition systems offer an abstraction of the event graph: each state represents a set of write events, while edges represent mo relationships between them. Thus, for \(x\), we see that all of the writes of \(37\) are mo-later than the initial write of \(0\). But these independent constraints alone are not enough: we must ensure that \(y\) can only be in state 1 if \(x\) is “known” to be in state 37.

In general, protocol states are abstract; the labels on the transition systems above are merely suggestive. Each state is given an interpretation, which constrains the values that may be written to the location in that state, but may also impose other constraints—including, as we will see, constraints on other protocols. (Treating states abstractly allows us to, in effect, associate a ghost variable with each memory location, as §4 will show.)

Formally, we assume a sort \(\text{State}\) of protocol states, ranged over by variables \(s\). GPS is parameterized by (1) the grammar of terms of sort \(\text{State}\) and (2) a set of protocol types (metavariable \(\tau\)). For each protocol type \(\tau\), the user of the logic specifies:

- A transition relation \(\sqsubseteq_{\tau}\), a partial order on states.
- A state interpretation \(\tau(s, z)\), an assertion in which \(s\) and \(z\) appear free (i.e., a predicate on \(s\) and \(z\)). The assertion represents what must be true of a value \(z\) for a thread to be permitted to write it to the location in state \(s\).

For the message passing example, we introduce a protocol type \(\text{Dat}\) governing location \(x\). Writing abstract states in bold, we say \(0 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Dat}} 0, 0 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Dat}} 37, 37 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Dat}} 37\), and define

\[
\text{Dat}(s, z) \triangleq (s = 0 \land z = 0) \lor (s = 37 \land z = 37)
\]

to give the protocol for \(y\), however, we need a way of talking about the protocol for \(x\) in its state interpretations. For this purpose, GPS offers protocol assertions, \(\ell : s \vdash \tau\), which say that location \(\ell\) is governed by the protocol type \(\tau\), and has been observed in state \(s\), thus giving a lower bound on the current protocol state.

We can now give the protocol for \(y\). We introduce a protocol type \(\text{Fig}(\ell)\) that is parameterized over a location \(\ell\) (which we will instantiate with \(x\)). Again writing abstract states in bold, we say \(0 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Fig}} 0, 0 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Fig}} 1, 1 \sqsubseteq_{\text{Fig}} 1\), and

\[
\text{Fig}(\ell)(s, z) \triangleq (s = 0 \land z = 0) \lor (s = 1 \land z = 1 \land \ell : 37 \vdash_{\text{Dat}})
\]
Thus, to move to state 1 in Flg(x), a thread must (1) write 1 to y and (2) have already observed that [x : 37 Dat], which it can ensure by first writing 37 to x itself.

What happens when a thread reads y? GPS supports the following Hoare triple for atomic reads of a location ℓ:4

\[
\forall s' \sqsupseteq, s. \forall z. \tau(s', z) \Rightarrow Q
\]

The precondition requires some pre-existing knowledge about ℓ’s protocol. (For the message receiver, this knowledge will be \([y : 0 \text{ Flg}(x)]\). The pre-existing knowledge gives a lower bound on the possible writes the read could read from: they must be at least as far as state s in the protocol. The premise of the rule then quantifies, abstractly, over the write we might be reading from: it must have moved to some future state s’ in the protocol, and have written some value z such that \(\tau(s’, z)\) holds. From all such possible writes, we derive a common assertion Q—but note that s’ and z can appear in Q, so it can tie together the value read and the state observed.

Altogether, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
[y]_{\text{at}} & \{ z. [y : 0 \text{ Flg}(x)] \land z = 0 \\
& \lor [y : 1 \text{ Flg}(x)] \land z = 1 \land [x : 37 \text{ Dat}] \}
\end{align*}
\]

So if a thread reads 1 from y, it learns a lower bound on the protocol state for x. If it subsequently reads x, it is guaranteed to see 37.

\[
\begin{align*}
[x]_{\text{at}} & \{ z. [y : 1 \text{ Flg}(x)] \land [x : 37 \text{ Dat}] \land z = 37 \}
\end{align*}
\]

Before describing the rest of GPS, we briefly consider the connection to the C11 model. GPS assertions say what is known at each point in a thread’s code, with each such point corresponding to a node in the event graph. A thread will only be able to claim \([\ell : s \tau]\) if a write moving \(\ell\) to (abstract) state \(s\) happens before the corresponding node in the event graph. But because writes to \(\ell\) in no order correspond to moves within the protocol, the thread can subsequently read only from a write in some state \(s' \sqsupseteq s\). PL-protocols have allowed us to abstract away from the event graph and to reason thread-locally: the thread receiving the message does not need to know anything about the code/events of the sending threads except that they follow the protocols.

### 3.2 Physical resources

GPS makes the simplifying assumption that each location is either always used nonatomically (i.e., for data), or always used atomically (i.e., for synchronization). Atomic locations can be freely shared between threads, which can only make protocol assertions about them; since protocol assertions are

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \{ Q \} e \{ \text{true} \}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \forall x. \{ Q' \} e' \{ y. R \} & P \Rightarrow Q
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} e \{ [x. (x = 0 \land P) \lor (x \neq 0 \land Q)] \} & P \Rightarrow Q
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \forall x. Q \Rightarrow Q'
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P' \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \forall x. \{ Q \} e' \{ y. R \} & P \Rightarrow Q
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P' \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \forall x. Q' \Rightarrow Q
\end{align*}
\]

**Figure 2.** A selection of basic logical rules for GPS

just lower bounds, they are invariant under interference from other threads. Nonatomic locations, on the other hand, must be treated as resources to ensure that only one thread can write to them at a time, in order to avoid data races. GPS thus includes the assertions

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} e \{ [x. Q] \} & \forall x. \{ Q' \} e' \{ y. R \} & P \Rightarrow Q
\end{align*}
\]

which resemble traditional separation logic, except that locations begin uninitialized. The heap assertion \(\ell \mapsto v\) means that \(\ell\) is classified as nonatomic, and currently points to value \(v\). We thus get the usual separation logic axioms for nonatomic locations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{true} \} \text{ alloc}(n) & \{ x. \text{uninit}(x) \ast \text{uninit}(x + n - 1) \}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{uninit}(\ell) & \lor \ell \mapsto v \; \{ \ell \mapsto v \}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\ell \mapsto v & \; \{ \ell \mapsto v \}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ x. x = v \ast \ell \mapsto v \}
\end{align*}
\]

The separating conjunction \(P \ast Q\) requires that resources claimed by \(P\) are disjoint from those of \(Q\), e.g.,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{uninit}(\ell) & \ast \text{uninit}(\ell') \Rightarrow \ell \neq \ell'
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\ell \mapsto v \ast \ell' \mapsto v' & \Rightarrow \ell \neq \ell'
\end{align*}
\]

but since atomic locations are shared, separation enforces only that different observations about their state cohere:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ell : s \tau & \ast \ell' : s' \tau' \Rightarrow \tau = \tau' \land (s \subseteq s' \lor s' \subseteq s)
\end{align*}
\]

In addition to these axioms, GPS supports the usual rules for a concurrent separation logic; see Figure 2.

### 3.3 Ghost resources

Our earlier presentation of protocols implicitly assumed that all threads can make the same moves within a protocol. But we often want to say that only certain threads have the right to make a particular move. To do so, we add non-physical resources—ghosts—to GPS. These purely logical resources are used to express arbitrary notions of permission that can be divided amongst threads. Here we explain what ghosts are; the subsequent subsections explain how they are used together with protocols.

Following recent work in separation logic [14, 22, 25], we model ghosts as partial commutative monoids (PCMs); GPS is parameterized by a collection of PCMs \(\mu\), such that

---

4 This rule is sound only for the assertions we have introduced so far; the general rule is given in “Ownership transfer through protocols”, below.
There is a sort $\text{PCM}_\mu$ for each $\mu$.
- Terms of sort $\text{PCM}_\mu$ include unit $\varepsilon_\mu$ and composition $\gamma_\mu$.

The unit represents the empty permission, while $t \cdot_\mu t'$ combines the permissions $t$ and $t'$. We do not want all compositions to be defined: we want certain permissions to be exclusive, meaning that they do not compose with themselves. So composition is a partial function, but is commutative and associative where defined (and $\varepsilon_\mu \cdot_\mu t = t$ for any $t$).

Within the logic, we add ghost assertions $\gamma_\mu : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu$, which claim ownership of the ghost permission $t$ drawn from some $\text{PCM}_\mu$. Since we may want to use many instances of a particular $\text{PCM}$, ghosts have an identity $\gamma$. Being nonphysical, ghosts are manipulated entirely through the rule of consequence, which is generalized to allow ghost moves $\Rightarrow$, rather than just implications; see Figure 2. These moves allow new ghosts $t$ to appear out of thin air, with a fresh identity: true $\Rightarrow \exists \gamma. \gamma_\mu : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu$. Once a ghost is created, it can be split apart using $\ast$, as follows:

$$\left[\gamma : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu\right] \Leftrightarrow \left[\gamma : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu\right] \cdot_\mu \left[\gamma : \varepsilon_\mu \cdot \mu j_\mu\right]$$

We take $\left[\gamma : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu\right] \ast$ to be false if $t \cdot_\mu t'$ is undefined.

A very simple but useful kind of permission is a token, which is meant to be owned by exactly one thread at a time. We can model this as a $\text{PCM}$, Tok, with two elements, $\varepsilon$ and $\diamond$ (the token), with $\varepsilon \diamond = \diamond \varepsilon = \diamond \cdot \diamond$. We leave the composition $\diamond \cdot \diamond$ undefined, so that $\left[\gamma \cdot \gamma : t \cdot_\mu j_\mu \cdot_\mu t \cdot_\mu j_\mu\right] \Rightarrow \text{false}$. Hence, GPS ensures the token for ghost $\gamma$ cannot be owned twice. (We use this $\text{PCM}$ in several examples in §3.6.)

### 3.4 Taking stock: resource ownership vs. knowledge

We have now seen the full complement of resource ownership assertions (physical and ghost) provided by GPS, with * combining or separating them. Ownership can be divided by the fork rule (Figure 2), which allows the parent thread to donate some of its resources to the child thread. But we will also need to transfer ownership between already-running threads—while ensuring, of course, that claims of ownership are not duplicated in the process. GPS provides two mechanisms for doing so, one physical and the other nonphysical, described in the next two subsections.

Both mechanisms rely on a fundamental distinction between assertions possibly involving resource ownership (like $\ell \leftrightarrow v$) and assertions only involving knowledge (like $t = t'$). The key is that, while ownership can come and go, knowledge remains true forever.

GPS has a modality $\Box$ for knowledge, where $\Box P$ holds if $P$ is true and does not depend on resource ownership—and therefore will remain true forever. These properties of knowledge are captured in two axioms:

$\Box P \Rightarrow P$

$\Box P \Rightarrow \Box P \ast \Box P$

Using the second axiom and the frame rule, we can derive:

$$\left\{ P \ast \Box R \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ x. \{ Q \} \ast \Box R \right\}$$

$$\left\{ P \ast \Box R \right\} \Rightarrow \left\{ x. \{ Q \} \ast \Box R \right\}$$

Knowledge is retained no matter what an expression does.

Knowledge includes assertions that are “pure” in the parlance of separation logic, like equalities on terms, but it also includes protocol observations:

$\ell = t' \Rightarrow \Box(t = t')$

$\ell : s \Rightarrow \Box \ell : s \Rightarrow$

On the other hand, assertions about ownership never constitute knowledge: the axiom $\Box(\ell \leftrightarrow v) \Rightarrow \text{false}$ says that it is impossible to treat nonatomic ownership as knowledge.

Finally, the $\Box$ modality distributes over $\land$, $\lor$, $\forall$, and $\exists$.

### 3.5 Ownership transfer through protocols

To explain physically-based ownership transfers, we consider a simple spinlock:

- NEW_LOCK() $\triangleq \text{let } x = \text{alloc(1) in } [x]_{\text{at}} := \text{unlocked}; x$
- lock(x) $\triangleq \text{repeat CAS}(x, \text{unlocked, locked})$ end
- unlock(x) $\triangleq [x]_{\text{at}} := \text{unlocked}$

where unlocked = 0 and locked = 1. We want to reason about this lock in the style of concurrent separation logic [30], i.e., we want to be able to prove the following triples:

$$\{ P \} \text{NEW_LOCK() } \{ x. \Box \text{isLock}(x) \}$$

$$\{ \text{isLock}(x) \} \text{lock(x) } \{ P \}$$

$$\{ \text{isLock}(x) \ast P \} \text{unlock(x) } \{ \text{true} \}$$

Here, the assertion $P$ is an arbitrary resource invariant (e.g., claiming ownership of nonatomic locations) protected by the lock, while isLock represents the permission to use the lock. These triples reflect a transfer of ownership of the resources satisfying $P$, first upon creation of the lock, and then between each successive thread that acquires the lock. But the whole point of the lock is to ensure that when multiple threads race to acquire it, only one will win—and it is the use of CAS that guarantees this, by physical atomicity. We want to leverage the fact that CAS physically arbitrates races to logically arbitrate ownership transfers.

To do so, we revise our understanding of protocol state interpretations: rather than just a way to communicate knowledge between threads, they are more generally a way to transfer resource ownership between threads. For the spinlock, we can get away with a simple protocol type $\text{LP}$ having a single state $\text{Inv}$, where

$$\text{LP}(\text{Inv}, z) \triangleq (z = \text{unlocked} \ast P) \lor z = \text{locked}$$

Intuitively, whenever a thread releases the lock, it must have reestablished the resource invariant $P$, which it then relinquishes, allowing $P$ to be transferred to the next thread acquiring the lock. We can then define isLock(x) $\triangleq [x] : \text{Inv} \mid \text{LP}$

To initialize an atomic location $\ell$ with state $s$ and value $v$, a thread must relinquish resources $\tau(s, v)$:

$$\{ \text{uninit}(\ell) \ast \tau(s, v) \} [\ell]_{\text{at}} := v \{ \ell : s \Rightarrow \}$$

which is reflected in the triple for newLock() above.
We currently own. We can therefore know that the protocol cannot be in state $s$.

This rule differs from the version we gave earlier in two respects. In the successful case, we observe the protocol in some state $s'$, and choose a new state $s''$ that is reachable from it. To make the move from $s'$ to $s''$, we (1) gain the resources $\tau(s', V_o)$, because we won the race to $\text{CAS}$, but (2) must relinquish resources $\tau(s'', V_n)$, which can be transferred to the next successful $\text{CAS}$ on $\ell$. We can use any resources $P$ we owned beforehand, and we get to keep any leftover resources $Q$.

The failure case works like an atomic read, except that we do not learn the exact value observed; we know only that it differs from the expected value $V_o$. Since multiple threads can read from the same write, it should not be possible to gain resources by reading alone— but it should still be possible to gain knowledge. Thus the full read rule is:

$$\forall s' \not\sqsupset s, \tau(s', V_o) \not\triangleright P \Rightarrow \exists s'' \sqsupset s', \tau(s'', V_n) \triangleright Q$$

$$\forall s'' \not\sqsupset s, \forall y \neq V_o, \tau(s'', y) \not\triangleright P \Rightarrow \square R$$

\[
\left\{ \ell : s \not\triangleright P \right\} \text{CAS}(\ell, V_o, V_n) \left\{ z, \exists s'', \ell : s'' \not\triangleright P \right\} \left\{ ((z = 1 \not\triangleright Q) \lor (z = 0 \not\triangleright P \not\triangleright R)) \right\}
\]

This rule differs from the version we gave earlier in two respects. First, the assertion $Q$ is placed under the $\square$ modality, ensuring that readers only gain knowledge, not resources, through the protocol. Second, the precondition includes an arbitrary assertion $P$, which we combine via $\triangleright$ with the interpretation of the state we are reading.

The inclusion of the assertion $P$ enables rely-guarantee reasoning through protocols. For the protocol to be in state $s'$, some thread must have written $z$ to $\ell$ while also giving up resources $\tau(s', z)$. If we read from this write, we know that the resources involved must be disjoint from any resources $P$ we currently own. We can therefore rule out certain protocol states on this basis. The typical way to do so is through ghosts: we can require that, to move to a certain protocol state $s'$, a thread must give up a ghost $t$ (e.g., a token). Thus, if a thread owns some ghost $t'$ such that $t \not\triangleright t'$ is undefined, then the thread knows that the protocol cannot be in state $s'$. We illustrate this kind of reasoning in the next subsection.

Finally, we have a rule for atomic writes:

$$P \triangleright \tau(s'', V) \not\triangleright Q \quad \forall s' \not\sqsupset s, \tau(s', -) \not\triangleright P \Rightarrow s'' \not\sqsupset s'$$

\[
\left\{ \ell : s \not\triangleright P \right\} \left\{ \ell \at \not\triangleright V \right\} \left\{ \ell : s \not\triangleright Q \right\}
\]

Writers are surprisingly subtle. Prior to writing, our thread knows some lower bound $s$ on the protocol state. But because the write may be racing with unknown other writes (or $\text{CAS}$es), we do not know (or learn!) the “current” state of the protocol. Instead, we must move to a state $s''$ that is reachable from any state $s \not\sqsupset s$ that concurrent threads may be moving to. As with reads and $\text{CAS}$es, though, we know that any such state $s''$ must be satisfiable with resources disjoint from our resources, $P$. In particular, if $\tau(s', -) \not\triangleright P \Rightarrow false$, then we do not have to show that $s'' \not\sqsupset s'$.

In summary:

- Reads relinquish nothing and gain knowledge.
- Writes relinquish ownership and gain nothing.
- $\text{CAS}$es relinquish and gain ownership when successful, and behave like reads when unsuccessful.

Returning to the simple spinlock example introduced at the beginning of this subsection, Figure 3 contains the proof outlines for $\text{newLock}()$, $\text{lock}(x)$, and $\text{unlock}(x)$. The proofs are straightforward and follow immediately from the rules for atomic accesses given in this subsection and the rules of Figure 2.

3.6 Ownership transfer through escrows

We have just shown how GPS axiomatizes ownership transfer for programs that use the explicit, built-in form of synchronization offered by $\text{CAS}$. But in fact programs can and do build up their own implicit mechanisms for ownership transfer without using $\text{CAS}$ (which is relatively expensive). We already saw such implicit synchronization at work in the original version of our “message-passing” example from $\S 2$:

\[
[x]_{na} := 37; \quad \text{repeat} [y]_{at} \text{ end; } [x]_{na}
\]

Unlike the version of this example that we showed how to verify in $\S 3.1$, this version transfers ownership of a nonatomic location ($x \leftrightarrow 37$) from one thread to another, and it does so without using $\text{CAS}$. Intuitively, the reason this works is that the threads have agreed ahead of time—implicitly—that once $y$ is set to 1, the second thread will have the exclusive permission to take ownership of $x$. (Indeed, the transfer would...
be unsound if there were two copies of the second thread operating concurrently.) However, since the second thread does not use CAS, it cannot transfer ownership of \( x \) directly out of \( y \)’s protocol—some additional mechanism is needed.

Thus we are led to the final concept in GPS: *escrows*. The idea is that a thread may indirectly transfer a resource to another thread by placing it “under escrow”: it is then inaccessible to any thread until some exclusive, logical condition is met, at which point the thread meeting the condition gains ownership of it. GPS is parameterized over a set of escrow types (metavariable \( \sigma \)) and definitions, written \( \sigma : P \leadsto Q \). Here \( Q \) represents the resource to be placed under escrow, while \( P \) represents the transfer condition. Moreover, \( \sigma \) must be exclusive (\( P \land P \Rightarrow \) false) to ensure that ownership of \( Q \) is only transferred out of the escrow to *one* receiving thread.

Escrows are created and used via ghost moves, where the assertion \([\sigma]\) says that an escrow of type \( \sigma \) is known to exist:

\[
\sigma : P \leadsto Q \quad \frac{Q \Rightarrow [\sigma]}{\sigma : P \leadsto Q} \quad \frac{\sigma : P \leadsto Q}{P \land [\sigma] \Rightarrow Q} \quad \frac{[\sigma]}{\sigma \Rightarrow \square [\sigma]}
\]

The first rule allows \( Q \) to be put under escrow; ownership is lost, in exchange for the knowledge \([\sigma]\)—and because \([\sigma]\) is knowledge, it can be learned about through reading. When later extracting the resource \( Q \) from the escrow \([\sigma]\), the condition \( P \) is consumed; this fact, together with the exclusivity of \( P \), ensures that an escrow can only be used to transfer ownership once.

Returning to the message-passing example, the idea is to define an escrow type, \( \text{XE}(\gamma) \), which governs the transfer of the resource \( x \leftrightarrow 37 \). The escrow type is parameterized by \( \gamma \), which is the name of an exclusive ghost token, \( \gamma \circ \text{Tok} \), that will be used to guard the escrow (i.e., as its transfer condition). The second thread will start out as the (unique) owner of this token, but then exchange it for ownership of \( x \). Formally, we define \( \text{XE}(\gamma) \) as follows:

\[
\text{XE}(\gamma) : \quad [\gamma \circ \text{Tok}] \leadsto x \leftrightarrow 37
\]

We then define a single protocol governing \( y \), namely \( \text{YP}(\gamma) \), with states 0 and 1 and transition relation \( \leq \), and the following state interpretations:

\[
\text{YP}(\gamma)(0, z) \triangleq z = 0
\]

\[
\text{YP}(\gamma)(1, z) \triangleq z = 1 \ast [\text{XE}(\gamma)]
\]

This protocol enforces that \( y \) progresses from 0 to 1, and when it is set to 1, the escrow \( \text{XE}(\gamma) \) must exist. Thus, before the first thread sets \( y \) to 1, it must first transfer the resource \( x \leftrightarrow 37 \) into the escrow \( \text{XE}(\gamma) \) so that it can then pass the knowledge of this escrow’s existence into the protocol. Once the second thread receives this knowledge from the protocol (by reading \( y \) as 1), it can trade in its ghost token for ownership of the resource \( x \leftrightarrow 37 \), as desired. This reasoning is summarized in the proof outline in Figure 4 (omitting the Tok type in the ghost assertions for brevity).

\[\begin{align*}
x & \leftarrow 0 \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
x & \leftarrow 37 \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
\text{XE}(\gamma) & \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
[y]_{ax} & := 1; \\
\{ y : 1 \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
\{ [z, z] = 37 \ast x \leftarrow 37 \}
\end{align*}\]

Figure 4. Proof outline for nonatomic message-passing

**A more challenging application of escrows** Although the above example succinctly illustrates the basic idea of escrows, it is perhaps not the most compelling one, given that it can be handled by other means in prior logics (such as RSL [38]).

We therefore turn now to an interesting synchronization algorithm (suggested to us by Ernie Cohen), whose GPS verification demonstrates an elegant use of escrows and which, to our knowledge, is beyond the reach of prior logics:

\[\begin{align*}
\{ x \leftarrow 0 \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \} \\
[x]_{ax} & := 37; \\
x & \leftarrow 37 \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
\text{XE}(\gamma) & \ast \{ [y : 0] \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
[y]_{ax} & := 1; \\
\{ y : 1 \ast \text{YP}(\gamma) \} \\
\{ [z, z] = 37 \ast x \leftarrow 37 \}
\end{align*}\]

The goal of this algorithm is to guarantee mutual exclusion using release-accumulate atoms, but without using CAS. The idea is that each thread sets its respective variable \( x \) or \( y \) to either 1 or 2 (using a nondeterministic choice operator, \( \text{choose} \)) and then checks the value chosen by the other thread. This enables the threads to synchronize implicitly based on a logical condition: the first thread wins if the values pointed to by \( x \) and \( y \) are equal, and the second wins if they are not.

Implicit in the algorithm is the invariant that once each thread sets its variable to 1 or 2, it will not change it further. As a consequence, unlike in Dekker’s algorithm (§2), each thread in Cohen’s algorithm relies only on *positive* information about the progress of the other thread—e.g., has \( y \) been set to some nonzero value yet and, if so, what?—in order to determine if it has won the race. Intuitively, it is this restriction to positive reasoning that makes Cohen’s algorithm work under release-accumulate semantics while Dekker’s doesn’t.

We now sketch the verification of Cohen’s algorithm (full details are given in the appendix [1]). Suppose that the winning thread should gain exclusive access to some shared resource \( P \). To verify Cohen’s algorithm, our basic idea is to place \( P \) under an escrow \( \text{PE} \) at the beginning (prior to the execution of either thread). The transfer condition for this escrow will be defined so as to be satisfiable only by whichever thread wins the race. Thus, once that thread knows it has won, it can unlock the escrow and gain access to \( P \).

Formally, at the beginning of the proof, four tokens will be created and passed to the two threads: the first thread (which sets \( x \)) will be given the tokens \( [\gamma_1 \circ \text{Tok}] \) and \( [\gamma_2 \circ \text{Tok}] \) and the second thread (which sets \( y \)) will be given the tokens \( [\gamma_3 \circ \text{Tok}] \) and \( [\gamma_4 \circ \text{Tok}] \). The \( \gamma_1 \)’s will be used to guard access to the...

---

5 As we discuss in Section 5, escrows are closely related to Bugliesi et al.’s notion of “exponential serialization” [7].
The main soundness result for GPS is simple to state:

**Theorem 1** Soundness. If \{true\} ⊆ \{x. P\} is provable then \([e] ⊆ \{V | \[P[V/x]\] ≠ \emptyset\}.

The theorem says that Hoare triples proved in GPS accurately predict the final result of a closed program, according to the C11 memory model.

But to prove this theorem, we must be able to relate the Hoare triples of the logic to C11’s event graphs, which do not provide the global notion of “current state” that the semantics of triples usually depend on.

### Overview of the model and proof

We structure the semantics of triples into two layers: local safety and global safety.

Local safety steps through the execution of a single thread, but instead of using an event graph and the C11 axioms to restrict the actions produced by the thread, it essentially re-plays the rules of GPS. For example, when a thread performs an acquire read, local safety enforces that the location being read is governed by a PL-protocol, and the value read is then constrained by that protocol—exactly mirroring the logic’s rule for acquire reads. Thus local safety provides a kind of “rely/guarantee semantics”: it checks that an abstract execution of a given thread follows the rules of the logic (i.e., making valid protocol moves) while relying on protocols to predict the outcome of reads (i.e., valid protocols moves made by other threads). When a new thread is forked, local safety is checked independently for the new thread and its parent. Since local safety is just a restatement of GPS’s rules in small-step form, it is easy to show that the proof rules of GPS preserve local safety.

Global safety applies to labeled event graphs, where the labels annotate graph edges with resource and knowledge transfers from the point of view of GPS. By imposing appropriate constraints on the labeling, global safety connects the logical assumptions made in local safety with the physical reality of the event graph.

The heart of the soundness argument is then to show that if a whole program is locally safe, it is globally safe. We do this by building up the C11 event graph step-by-step (much like the operational semantics), showing for each new event that (1) the existing labeling implies the rely for the event, and (2) the event’s guarantee, which we know by local safety, implies that we can extend the labeling to include it.

Unfortunately, space constraints prevent us from describing the semantic model and proof—both of which are substantial—in full detail here. Below, we sketch a few of the key details. The full semantic model is described in the appendix, and the entire model and soundness proof (as well as an extension of the logic to handle SC accesses) have been formalized and checked in our Coq development [1].

**Resources** In the semantics of GPS, a resource \(r\) is a tuple \((\Pi, g, \Sigma)\) containing:

- A physical location map \(\Pi\) from locations to either a value (for nonatomics) or a protocol and state (for atomics).
- A ghost identity map \(g\) from ghost names to an element of the corresponding ghost PCM.
- A known escrow set \(\Sigma\) containing all escrow types currently in play.

Resources form a PCM with composition \(\oplus\), and assertions are interpreted as sets of resources, e.g.,

\[
 r \in \[P_1 \oplus P_2\] \equiv \exists r_1, r_2, r = r_1 \oplus r_2, r_1 \in \[P_1\], r_2 \in \[P_2\] \]

The structure of resources and definition of \(\oplus\) are designed to support the axioms on assertions we gave in §3.

**Local safety** With resources in hand, we can define a semantic version of ghost moves \(r \Rightarrow P\), which says that from resource \(r\) it is possible to take a ghost move to resources described by the (semantic) assertion \(P\). We can also define two functions

\[
 rely, guar : Resource \times Action \rightarrow P(Resource)
\]
that describe the rely and guarantee constraints on updating resources, given that we are performing some action \( \alpha \). For example, if \( \alpha = \mathbb{R}(\ell, V, na) \) and \( r \) claims that \( \ell \rightarrow V' \), then

\[
\text{rely}(r, \alpha) = \text{if } V = V' \text{ then } \{ r \} \text{ else } \emptyset
\]

which says that the action is only possible if the value it claims to read is the one the logic says the location has. This precisely mirrors the rule for nonatomic reading, and in particular yields no new resources. For atomic locations, the protocol state is allowed to advance, again mirroring the logic’s rule for atomic reads.

We can then define local safety:

\[
\begin{align*}
 r_{\text{pre}} &\in \text{LSafe}_n(e, \Phi) \triangleq \text{always} \\
r_{\text{pre}} &\in \text{LSafe}_{n+1}(e, \Phi) \approx \text{(simplified; see appendix)}
\end{align*}
\]

If \( e \in \text{Val} \) then \( r_{\text{pre}} \Rightarrow \Phi(e) \)

If \( e = K\{ \forall x. e' \} \) then

\[
r_{\text{pre}} \in \text{LSafe}_n(K[0], \Phi) \ast \text{LSafe}_n(e', \text{true})
\]

If \( e = e' \) then \( \forall r' \in \text{rely}(r_{\text{pre}}, \alpha) \), \( \exists P, r \Rightarrow P \) and

\[
\forall r' \in P, \exists r_{\text{post}} \in \text{guar}(r', \alpha). r_{\text{post}} \in \text{LSafe}_n(e', \Phi)
\]

which is indexed by the number of steps for which we demand safety. (An expression is “locally safe” if \( \text{LSafe}_n \) holds for all \( n \).) Local safety can be understood as giving weakest preconditions: \( \text{LSafe}_n(e, \Phi) \) is the set of starting resources for which \( e \) can safely execute for \( n \) steps with postcondition \( \Phi \) (a semantic predicate). Then we define

\[
\models \{ P \} e \{ x.Q \} \triangleq \forall n, \forall r' \in \{ P \}. r \Rightarrow \text{LSafe}_n(e, \{ x. Q \})
\]

**Theorem 2** (Local soundness). All of the proof rules given in §3 are sound for this semantics of Hoare triples.

**Global safety** We then define a notion of global safety, written \( \text{GSafe}_n(T, G, \mathcal{L}) \), over an instrumented thread pool \( T \), an event graph \( G \), and a labeling \( \mathcal{L} \).

The instrumented thread pool \( T \) maps each thread to a tuple \( (a, e, r, \Phi) \), specifying the last event \( a \) that the thread performed in the event graph, the remainder \( e \) of its computation, the resources \( r \) that it currently holds, and its postcondition \( \Phi \). Global safety at \( n \) assumes that each thread is locally safe for \( n \) more steps, given its resources and postcondition.

The labeling \( \mathcal{L} \) annotates hb edges of the graph with resource transfers between the nodes, and is constrained to ensure that each node obeys the corresponding guard condition. Since each atomic write to a location \( \ell \) is associated logically with a move in \( \ell \)'s protocol, the labeling \( \mathcal{L} \) also annotates each write event for \( \ell \) with information about the corresponding state to which \( \ell \)'s protocol was updated.

The labeling must then globally ensure the following:

- **Compatibility**: any set of “concurrent” resource transfers (i.e., roughly, those that are not hb-related) must be composable with one another, ensuring that exclusive resources are never duplicated.
- **Conformance**: if \( \text{mo}(a, b) \) for two atomic writes/updates to \( \ell \) with protocol \( \tau \), the protocol states with which \( a \) and \( b \) are labeled must be related by \( \leq_\tau \).

**Soundness** The key theorem is a kind of simulation between the expression semantics and global safety:

**Theorem 3** (Instrumented execution). If \( \text{GSafe}_{n+1}(T, G, \mathcal{L}) \) and \( \langle \text{erase}(T); G \rangle \rightarrow \langle T'; G' \rangle \) then there is some \( T', \mathcal{L}' \) such that \( \text{erase}(T') = T' \) and \( \text{GSafe}_n(T', G', \mathcal{L}') \).

Our main soundness result, given at the beginning of the section, is then a corollary connecting the proof theory all the way to the C11 execution (for closed expressions).

### 4. Case studies

We have applied GPS to three challenging case studies for weak memory reasoning: *Michael and Scott’s lock-free queue* [28], as well as *circular buffers* [19] and *bounded ticket locks* [10] (both adapted from the Linux kernel). Note that the first two of these exhibit non-SC behavior to their clients (cf. §5). For space reasons, we focus here on the proof for circular buffers, which we describe in some detail. For full details of all three examples, see the appendix [1].

**Circular buffers** Figure 6 shows the code for a simplified variant of the circular buffer data structure drawn from the Linux kernel. It is a fixed-size queue, implemented using an array that “wraps around”. Specifically, the queue pointed to by \( q \) consists of an \( N \)-cell array (at \( q + b \) ), together with a reader index (at \( q + r \) ) specifying the array offset of the next item to be consumed, and a writer index (at \( q + w \) ) specifying the array offset of the next item to be produced. The “active” part of the queue consists of the array elements starting at the reader index and ending at the one prior to the writer index, wrapping around modulo \( N \). Hence, if the two indices are equal, then the buffer is empty, and if the writer index is one before the reader index (modulo \( N \) ), then the buffer is full (with \( N - 1 \) elements).

The \( \text{tryProd} \) and \( \text{tryCons} \) operations first check the two indices to see whether the buffer is full or empty, respectively. If so, they return 0. Otherwise, they proceed by writing/reading the element at the writer/reader index and then incrementing that index (modulo \( N \)). Since accesses to the actual data in the buffer are completely synchronized, the cells comprising the array itself can be read and written nonatomically. All synchronization is performed through the reader/writer indices. Note, however, that (as in Cohen’s example from §3.6) this synchronization is entirely implicit: the algorithm uses plain writes, not CAS, to increment the indices. While this is an efficiency win (e.g., on x86, the algorithm requires no fences), it means that only one producer and one consumer can operate simultaneously.

**The specification** We will prove the following spec:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{true} \} & \text{newBuffer}() \{ q. (\text{Prod}(q) \land \text{Cons}(q)) \}
\{ \text{Prod}(q) \} \text{tryProd}(q, x) \{ x. (\text{Prod}(q) \land (x = 0 \lor P(x))) \}
\{ \text{Cons}(q) \} \text{tryCons}(q) \{ x. (\text{Cons}(q) \land (x = 0 \lor P(x))) \}
\end{align*}
\]

The spec is parameterized over a predicate \( P \) that should hold of all the elements in the buffer; it guarantees that \( P(x) \)
holds of all elements $x$ that the consumer consumes so long as it holds of all elements $x$ that the producer produces. This predicate can thus be used in typical separation-logic style to transfer ownership of data structures from producer to consumer.\(^6\) The spec also employs two predicates $\text{Prod}(q)$ and $\text{Cons}(q)$, which describe the privilege of acting as producer or consumer, respectively. These predicates are exclusive resources, ensuring that there can only be one call to $\text{tryProd}$ and one call to $\text{tryCons}$ running concurrently. Their definitions (in Figure 5) are described below.

Note that this spec is rather weak because it does not enforce that the buffer actually implements a queue. This is merely for simplicity—it is easy to generalize our proof to handle a stronger spec, e.g., in which $P$, $\text{Prod}$, and $\text{Cons}$ are allowed to keep track of the entire sequence of elements produced thus far.

**High-level picture** Our proof of the above spec (Figure 6) depends on all the features of GPS working in concert. Figure 5 shows the technical setup for the proof.

**First**, we use protocols $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ to govern the states of the writer and reader indices, respectively. The state of each of these protocols tracks the “absolute state” of the corresponding index, meaning the total number of writes/reads that have ever occurred, which can only increase over time (the state ordering is $\leq$). The state interpretation of $\text{PP}/\text{CP}$ then dictates that the “physical state” of the writer/reader index equal the absolute state modulo $N$.

**Second**, since the buffer does not use CAS, it is not possible to use the $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ protocols to directly transfer ownership of the cells in the buffer between the producer and consumer. Fortunately, we can indirectly exchange ownership of the buffer cells instead, by (a) placing the cells under escrows, and (b) using $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ as a conduit for the knowledge that these escrows, once created, exist. Specifically, after filling a buffer cell with a new element, the producer will pass control of the cell to the consumer via the $\text{CE}$ escrow (see Step 10 in the proof of $\text{tryProd}$); upon consumption, the consumer will pass control of the cell back to the producer via the $\text{PE}$ escrow. The state interpretations of $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ offer a way to communicate awareness of these escrows back and forth.

\(^6\) In the case that the buffer is full, i.e., return value $z = 0$, the $\text{tryProd}$ operation simply returns ownership of $P(x)$ to the caller.

**Third**, we use *ghost tokens* in a manner similar to the proof of Cohen’s example from the previous section. The prot$P(i)$ and prot$C(i)$ tokens are needed in order to transition to (absolute) state $i$ of the $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ protocols, respectively, while the esc$P$ and esc$C$ tokens are used as transfer conditions for the $\text{PE}$ and $\text{CE}$ escrows. In both cases, the producer and consumer each start out with all the tokens they will ever need (i.e., rest$P(0)$ and rest$C(0)$) as part of their exclusive resource predicates $\text{Prod}(q)$ and $\text{Cons}(q)$, and they proceed to “spend” one protocol token and one escrow token upon each call to $\text{tryProd}$/$\text{tryCons}$. All these tokens are defined in Figure 5 as elements of the ghost PCM $\text{pcm}[\mathbb{N}] \times \text{pcm}[\mathbb{N}] \times \text{pcm}[\mathbb{N}] \times \text{pcm}[\mathbb{N}]$ (with composition defined as componentwise $\circ$).

**Finally**, tying everything together, $\text{Prod}(q)$ and $\text{Cons}(q)$ assert bounded knowledge about the states of the $\text{PP}$ and $\text{CP}$ protocols, thus enforcing the fundamental invariant of circular buffers:

The absolute writer index is at least $0$ and less than $N$ cells ahead of the absolute reader index.

Now, the reader (of this paper, not the buffer) may rightly wonder: how can this fundamental invariant possibly be enforced in the weak memory setting, given that it concerns the states of two separate cells being updated by different threads? The answer is that, although neither the producer nor the consumer can fully assume or maintain this invariant themselves, they are each able to enforce a piece of it sufficient to verify their own correctness. In particular, the consumer controls the progress of the reader index, and can therefore assume and maintain the invariant that the reader index never overtakes the writer index (the “at least $0$” part), while the producer controls the progress of the writer index, and can therefore assume and maintain the invariant that the writer index never leaves the reader index more than $N - 1$ cells behind (the “less than $N$” part). Together, these piecemeal enforcements of the fundamental invariant are enough to perform the full verification.

**Proof outline for tryProd** Figure 6 displays the proof outline for $\text{tryProd}(q, x)$. (The proof for $\text{tryCons}$ is almost dual, and the proof for $\text{newBuffer}$ is comparatively simple; see the appendix.) We explain here some of the most important steps in the proof. Throughout, note that assertions under...
wi ⊑ 0, ri ⊑ 1, b ⊑ 2

let q = alloc(N+2)
let w = [q+wi]at := 0;
let w[wi]at := 0;
q

let w′ = w+1 mod N

if w′ == r then
  0
else
  [q+b+w]na := x;
  [q+wi]at := w′;

let x = [q+b+r]na
let r′ = r+1 mod N
if w == r then
  0
else
  let x = [q+b+r]na
  [q+ri]at := r′;

Step 1: By unfolding Prod(q), we gain access to our piece of the fundamental invariant, namely that the absolute writer index \( i \) is less than \( N \) past the absolute reader index, which is at least \( j_0 \).

Step 2: The reason we know exactly what \( i \) is—but merely have a lower bound on \( j_0 \)—is that we own the protocol tokens \( \text{protP}(k) \) for all \( k < i \), constraining the possible "rely" moves that other threads can make in the \( \text{PP} \) protocol. In this step, we exploit that knowledge to assert that the value \( w \) we read is exactly \( i \) mod \( N \).

Step 3: Here we read the current reader index \( r \), whose absolute state \( j \) must be at least \( j_0 \) (as mentioned already). From the read of protocol \( \text{CP} \) at state \( j \), we also gain knowledge of the escrows \( \text{PE}(\gamma, q, k) \) for all \( k < j + N \).

Step 4: Since \( i < j_0 + N \leq j + N \), the escrows we just learned about in the previous step include \( \text{PE}(\gamma, q, i) \), which we need later.

Step 5: If the buffer is full, i.e., \( r = (w + 1) \mod N \), then the operation is a no-op and we simply return \( P(x) \) back to the caller.

Step 6: Otherwise, \( r \neq (w + 1) \mod N \). We know from Step 4 that \( i < j + N \), and we want to show \( i + 1 < j + N \) because this is the piece of the fundamental invariant that we are responsible for maintaining when we bump up the writer index at the end of the operation (Step 12). To prove this, we must establish \( i + 1 \neq j + N \). So suppose the opposite is true: \( i + 1 = j + N \). Then, since \( w = i \mod N \), we obtain \( (w + 1) \mod N = (i + 1) \mod N = (j + N) \mod N = j \mod N = r \). Contradiction.

Step 7: From our stash of tokens (\( \text{restP}(i) \)), we peel off a protocol token (\( \text{protP}(i + 1) \)) for advancing to the \( (i + 1) \)-th state of the \( \text{PP} \) protocol, and an escrow token (\( \text{escP}(i) \)) for accessing the escrow \( \text{PE}(\gamma, q, i) \) that we learned about in Step 4.

Step 8: We access the escrow, thereby gaining ownership of the buffer cell at index \( w \).

Step 9: We non-atomically write \( x \) to the buffer cell.

Step 10: We pass control of the buffer cell back to the consumer by placing it under the consumer escrow \( \text{CE}(\gamma, q, i) \).

Step 11: We advance the absolute writer index (i.e., the state of the \( \text{PP} \) protocol) to \( i + 1 \), which we can do because (a) we own the token \( \text{protP}(i + 1) \), and (b) we have knowledge of \( \text{CE}(\gamma, q, i) \).

Step 12: Thanks to Step 6, we have preserved the “less than” \( N \) part of the fundamental invariant, as demanded by Prod(q).
5. Related work

5.1 From SC reasoning to weak memory reasoning

As explained in the introduction, the various logical mechanisms employed by GPS are not fundamentally new: they are all either descendants or restrictions of mechanisms proposed in prior logics for strong (SC) concurrency.

First and foremost, many recent SC logics support some form of protocol for describing fine-grained invariants on shared state; GPS’s per-location (PL) protocols are inspired most directly by the protocols of CaReSL [37]. CaReSL’s protocols take the form of state transition systems (STSs) wherein each STS state is associated with an invariant about some underlying shared state. The primary difference between GPS’s protocols and CaReSL’s protocols is that CaReSL’s protocols are not restricted to governing the contents of a single location: they may govern arbitrary heap regions, and this additional flexibility renders them suitable for verifying programs that assume sequential consistency.

For instance, the CaReSL protocol for verifying Dekker’s algorithm (§2) would look something like this:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
0, 0 \\
\rightarrow \\
1, 0 \\
\rightarrow \\
0, 1 \\
\rightarrow \\
1, 1
\end{array}
\]

Here, each protocol state governs the contents of \( x \) and \( y \) simultaneously. In the (1, 0) state the first thread has won the race; in the (0, 1) state the second thread has won the race; and in the (1, 1) state the race is over (and it is impossible to tell who won). The verification of Dekker’s algorithm just has to ensure that (a) each thread only makes state changes according to the protocol, which is easy since updating \( x \) or \( y \) from 0 to 1 is always legal according to the protocol, and (b) each thread only accesses the shared resource once it has observed the protocol being in its respective winning state.

In the weak memory setting, the kind of simultaneous invariant represented by the above protocol, relating the “current” states of \( x \) and \( y \), is unsound because the updates to \( x \) and \( y \) may appear in different orders to the first and second threads. It is a key original insight in the design of GPS that the soundness of CaReSL-style protocols for weak memory can in fact be regained if we simply restrict them to governing a single location at a time.

GPS’s support for ghost state is also inspired by CaReSL, but the mechanisms are somewhat different. CaReSL supports ghost state through “tokens”, which are coupled with its protocol mechanism, whereas in GPS ghost state is handled separately via ghost PCMs [14, 22, 25]. (In this paper, we have only made use of simple token-like ghost PCMs, but the “bounded ticket lock” example, shown in the appendix [1], employs a much more interesting PCM.) GPS’s separation of orthogonal mechanisms has the side benefit of removing CaReSL’s “token purity” restriction—e.g., in the circular buffer example from Section 4, we did not require any side condition on the per-item predicate \( P(x) \), whereas an analogous proof in CaReSL would have required that \( P(x) \) be a “token-pure” (i.e., duplicable) assertion.

GPS’s escrows, \( P \Rightarrow Q \), can be viewed as yet another kind of CaReSL-style protocol, restricted in a different way than PL-protocols are. Escrows are essentially protocols with two states: before and after the resource being held in escrow, \( Q \), has been exchanged for the escrow condition, \( P \). Escrows are sound in the weak memory setting because the only thread that can observe anything at all about the protocol is the thread that exchanges \( P \) for \( Q \). Since that thread owns \( P \), and \( P \) is exclusive, it can deduce that the escrow is in the before state, and therefore safely transition to the after state, without any concern about the observations of other threads.

Although in the context of concurrency logics the escrow mechanism is unusual, there is some precedent for it: escrows are very similar to “exponential serialization”, a mechanism proposed by Bugliesi et al. [7] as part of an affine type system for verifying cryptographic protocols. Bugliesi et al. employ this mechanism for much the same reasons we do—namely, as a way of indirectly transferring control of an exclusive resource from one thread to another across a duplicable, “knowledge-only” channel. However, in their case the channel takes the form of a cryptographic signing key, whereas for us it is a shared memory location. Logically, the main difference between escrows and exponential serialization is that the precondition of escrow creation—i.e., that the escrow transfer condition \( P \) is exclusive (\( P \Rightarrow \neg \)false)—is something we can prove easily within the logic of GPS. In contrast, since the primitive affine predicates of Bugliesi et al.’s type system have no underlying semantic interpretation, they can only ensure the analogous exclusiveness condition via a complex and syntactic “guardedness” check on typing contexts.

5.2 Relaxed Separation Logic (RSL)

The closest related work to GPS is the recent Relaxed Separation Logic (RSL) introduced by Vafeiadis and Narayan [38], which is the only prior program logic for the C11 memory model. The goal of RSL is to support simple reasoning about release-acquire accesses in the style of Concurrent Separation Logic (CSL) [30]. Unlike in GPS, it is possible in RSL for a release write to directly transfer resource ownership to an acquire read (e.g., in verifying the nonatomic message-passing example, for which GPS required escrows). To manage such transfers, RSL employs release/acquire permissions describing the resources to be transferred upon a write to a given location. The choice of resources depends solely on the value being written, and so any given value can only be used to perform a transfer once per location.

GPS draws much inspiration from RSL, particularly in its proof of soundness, whose structure is based closely on RSL’s. There are many significant differences, however. Most importantly, GPS offers a much more flexible way of coordinating ownership and knowledge transfers between threads—including rely-guarantee reasoning—through its
protocols, ghosts, and escrows. These mechanisms refactor and generalize the permission-based reasoning of RSL, thus allowing us to lift several of RSL’s restrictions, including the one on repeated writes of the same value. Lifting this restriction is crucial for handling the indices in the circular buffer, and the ticket numbers in the bounded ticket lock, as these are cases where the same value is “recycled” (i.e., written to a location multiple times, and each time used to perform a different resource transfer). To our knowledge, none of our case studies can be verified in RSL.

5.3 Alternative approaches
Most existing approaches to reasoning about weak memory rely in some way on recovering strong memory assumptions, either by imposing a synchronization discipline or by reasoning directly about low-level hardware details.

**Recovering SC by synchronization discipline**
Most memory models satisfy the so-called fundamental property [34]: they guarantee sequential consistency for “sufficiently synchronized” code. (Synchronization operations like memory fences effectively thwart compiler and CPU optimizations.) Thus, if one can use a concurrency logic or some other means to enforce a strong synchronization discipline, one can recover strong memory reasoning for programs that follow that discipline. Instances of this approach include:

- Owens [31] proves that data-race free and “triangular-race” free programs on x86-TSO have SC behavior.
- Batty et al. [4] prove that for C11 restricted to nonatomic and SC-atomics, data-race freedom ensures SC behavior.
- Cohen and Schirmer [8] prove that programs following a certain ownership discipline and flushing write buffers at certain times on TSO models have SC behavior.
- Ferreira et al. [17] prove that concurrent separation logic is sound for a class of weak memory models satisfying a data-race freedom guarantee.

All of these disciplines force programs to use enough synchronization to keep weak memory behavior unobservable. We view them as complementary to GPS: they delimit an important subset of programs for which SC reasoning is sound within a weak memory model. Ultimately, our goal is to derive such disciplines within a more general weak memory program logic like GPS. Our treatment of locks in §3 already does this for the simple case of recovering CSL-style reasoning within weak memory: our lock spec provides the key concurrency rules for CSL as a derived set of rules in GPS.

We believe the extra generality of GPS is important because it enables us to verify a wider class of weak memory programs, including those whose observable behavior is not SC. The circular buffer and Michael-Scott queue are good examples of this (see the appendix [1]). Singh et al. [35] argue that one should not expose the high-level programmer to such non-SC data structures, but GPS shows that in fact it is possible to reason sensibly and modularly about them.

**Recovering SC through low-level reasoning**
Another way of recovering strong memory is to explicitly model low-level hardware details (e.g., per-processor write buffers) within one’s logic [33, 40], or to transform the program being verified so that interactions with write buffers, for instance, are made manifest in its code [2]. While this type of approach can accommodate arbitrary programs and enable the reuse of existing SC techniques, it provides little abstraction or modularity: users of such an approach must reason directly with the low-level hardware details, with relatively little help given in structuring this reasoning.

Ridge [33] provides a program logic for x86-TSO that supports rely-guarantee reasoning. The logic works directly with the operational x86-TSO model [32], and includes assertions about both program counters and write buffers. Rely constraints must be stable under the (nondeterministic) flushing of write buffers.

Wehrman and Berdine [40] propose a separation logic for x86-TSO which directly models store buffers and provides both temporal and spatial separating conjunctions, as well as resource invariants in the style of CSL. Unfortunately, the logic as proposed has some (known) soundness gaps, and to our knowledge a sound version has not yet been developed.

6. Future work
While GPS makes a significant step forward in reasoning about release/acquire semantics, there is much work left to do to develop a full understanding of the C11 memory model.

**Interaction with SC**
In our Coq development, we show that the reasoning principles for release-acquire atomics apply to SC atomics as well. In addition, we believe that if each memory location were uniquely used in conjunction with one access mode (e.g., always release-acquire or always SC), then it would be straightforward to supplement GPS with completely separate (and stronger) reasoning principles for SC atomics, along the lines of prior SC logics. However, the C11 model allows programmers to freely mix memory orderings, and ideally program logics should support such mixed reasoning as well. Early investigation suggests that the C11 model has some corner cases when mixing memory orderings that may obstruct compositional reasoning principles.

**Consume reads**
The C11 memory model supports a weaker mode for reads, called consume reads, under which happens-before relationships are only introduced for subsequent actions that depend on the value that was read. Such consume reads are used crucially, for example, in the implementation of read-copy-update (RCU) synchronization in the Linux kernel [27]. We believe it should be possible to extend GPS with support for consume reads, and that reasoning about compositionally about them will likely require the introduction of a modality encapsulating possible data dependencies.

**Relaxed operations**
Finally, C11 offers fully relaxed memory orderings, which induce no happens-before relationships.
If both relaxed reads and writes are allowed, the formal C11 model permits causal cycles: an execution can produce a value “out of thin air” through a cycle of relaxed read and write operations [5]. As noted in the RSL paper [38], these cycles inhibit even very basic forms of logical reasoning, including single-location invariants, and they also inhibit program analyses that are routinely used for optimization. (RSL includes rules for reasoning about relaxed accesses, but only under a severely restricted version of the C11 memory model.) We therefore believe that C11 should be revised to rule out these and other causal cycles, which will enable us to find sound reasoning principles for relaxed operations.

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References
[1] Appendix and Coq development for this paper available at the following URL: http://plv.mpi-sws.org/gpr/.
A. Language

A.1 Syntax

Val

\[ V ::= n \]

OVal

\[ v ::= x | V \]

Exp

\[ e ::= v | v + v | v == v | v \mod v | \text{let } x = e \text{ in } e | \text{repeat } e \text{ end} | \text{fork } e \]

OrderAnn

\[ O ::= \text{at} | \text{na} \]

EvalCtx

\[ K ::= [] | \text{let } x = K \text{ in } e \]

Action

\[ \alpha ::= S | A(\ell, \ell') | W(\ell, V, O) | R(\ell, V, O) | U(\ell, V, V) \]

ActName

\[ a \] (an infinite set)

ActMap

\[ A \in \text{ActName} \]

Graph

\[ G ::= (A, s, b, m, r) \quad s, b, m \subseteq \text{dom}(A) \times \text{dom}(A), r \in \text{dom}(A) \rightarrow \text{dom}(A) \]

ThreadMap

\[ T \in \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{(ActName \times Exp)} \]

A.2 Semantics

Event steps \[ e \xrightarrow{\alpha} e' \]

\[
\begin{align*}
n + m & \xrightarrow{S} k, k = n + m \\
n \mod m & \xrightarrow{S} k, k = n \mod m \\
n == m & \xrightarrow{S} 1, n = m \\
n != m & \xrightarrow{S} 0, n \neq m \\
\text{let } x = V \text{ in } e & \xrightarrow{S} e[V/x] \\
\text{repeat } e \text{ end} & \xrightarrow{S} \text{let } x = e \text{ in if } x \text{ then } x \text{ else } \text{repeat } e \text{ end} \\
\text{if } V \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 & \xrightarrow{S} e_1, V \neq 0 \\
\text{if } V \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 & \xrightarrow{S} e_2, V = 0 \\
\text{alloc}(n) & \xrightarrow{A(\ell, \ell' \oplus n - 1)} \ell \\
[e]_O & \xrightarrow{R(\ell, V, O)} V \\
[e]_O := V & \xrightarrow{W(\ell, V, O)} 0 \\
\text{CAS}(\ell, V, V) & \xrightarrow{U(\ell, V, V, a)} 1 \\
\text{CAS}(\ell, V, V, V) & \xrightarrow{U(\ell, V', \ell', a)} 0, V' \neq V_0 \\
\text{FAI}(\ell) & \xrightarrow{\ell} V, V' = (V + 1) \mod C \\
K[e] & \xrightarrow{\alpha} K[e'], e \xrightarrow{\alpha} e' 
\end{align*}
\]

Machine steps \[ (T; G) \longrightarrow (T'; G') \]

We discuss the validity of these operational rules in section A.3 below.

execs(e) \[ \triangleq \{ (e', G) \mid \langle [i \mapsto (\text{start}, e)]; ([\text{start} \mapsto S], \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset) \rangle \longrightarrow^* \langle [i \mapsto (\_, e') \cup T]; G \rangle \} \]

\[ [e] \triangleq \begin{cases} \text{err} & \exists (\_, G) \in \text{execs}(e), \text{dataRace}(G) \lor \text{memoryError}(G) \\ \{ V \mid (V, \_) \in \text{execs}(e) \} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]
A.3 Memory model

A.3.1 The C11 atomic access modes

The C11 standard [20, 21] includes several kinds of atomic accesses: sequentially-consistent, release-acquire, release-consume, and fully relaxed. We have focused on release-acquire, because:

- Sequentially-consistent accesses are already well-understood.
- Release-consume atomics are useful only for specific architectures (PowerPC and Arm), but substantially complicate the memory model.
- Fully relaxed accesses, as formalized by Batty et al. [3], suffer from several known problems. First, they allow out-of-thin-air reads, which the text of the standard explicitly forbids [20, 21]—but it is not known how to rule out these reads without also obstructing key compiler optimizations. On the other hand, even as formalized, fully relaxed access do not permit certain basic optimizations [38]. They also pose severe problems for compositional reasoning [5, 38].

As we explain in section A.3.4, however, GPS is sound for the full C11 model as formalized by Batty et al. [3].

A.3.2 The formal C11 model

The C11 memory model we use is based on the formalization of Batty et al. [3], as simplified by Batty et al. [4] in the absence of release-consume atomics. We also incorporate the following simplifications introduced by Vafeiadis and Narayan [38]:

- The \(sb\) and \(sw\) orders are not transitive; e.g., \(sb\) relates each event only to its immediate successors in program order. This simplifies both the operational semantics of the language and the semantics of GPS. Since \(hb\) is transitively closed, this has no effect on the memory model axioms.
- The “additional synchronized with” edges are incorporated into \(sb\) rather than \(sw\), which again makes no difference for the axioms but simplifies the semantics.
- For uniformity, the \(sw\) edges include \(sb\)-related events, whereas in [4] these are ruled out. Since \(hb\) includes both \(sw\) and \(sb\), this makes no difference to the axioms.

In addition to these simplifications, our formalization of the memory model drops release sequences, instead requiring \(sw\) edges only between immediate atomic read/write pairs. Consequently, our axioms are strictly weaker than those in e.g., Batty et al. [3], since we require strictly fewer \(sw\) edges. GPS does not have proof rules that take advantage of release sequences, so it is sound with or without them. See section A.3.4.

A.3.3 Justifying the operational semantics

The C11 axioms are generally understood to apply to an entire program execution, but the operational semantics we have given assumes that we can construct the event graph in a step-by-step fashion while guaranteeing consistency with C11 at every step. It also assumes that we can introduce read events in such an order that they always read from write events already appearing in the event graph. It does not assume, however, that new write events appear at the end of mo sequences.

These assumptions are justified by the fact that, in the absence of release-consume and relaxed operations, we know that for any complete execution satisfying the C11 axioms:

- The \(hb\) order is acyclic, and
- If \(rf(b) = a\) then \(hb(a, b)\).

Since the \(sb\) order is dictated by the program text and is a sub-order of \(hb\), there is some sequence of events in program order that is also in \(hb\) order. Based on the second bullet above, we know we can generate the event graph of the complete execution step-by-step using an operational semantics, while assuming that new nodes read only from previous nodes. Finally, because the event graphs generated in each step are prefixes of the complete event graph that are closed under \(rf\) and \(hb\)-predecessors, we know that if the axioms hold of the complete graph, they hold of the prefixes.

It is therefore also possible to instead work with the usual semantics, in which consistency is only assumed for the entire execution, which is how soundness of RSL is proved [38]. We chose to check prefix consistency mainly to simplify the soundness proof for GPS, and in particular the statement of the instrumented execution theorem (i.e., Theorem 8).

A.3.4 Soundness for the full C11 model

Despite all of the above-mentioned simplifications, GPS is trivially sound for the full C11 model: any program verified by GPS is guaranteed to only use release-acquire atomics, which formally justifies most of the simplifications made above [see 4]. The additional simplification we have made here of dropping release sequences is easy to justify: doing so strictly weakens the axioms, so any execution consistent under the semantics of [4] is consistent under the axioms given below.
A.3.5 Axioms

consistentC11(A, sb, mo, rf) ≡
∀a, b. mo(a, b) ⇒ ∃ℓ. writes(a, ℓ, −), writes(b, ℓ, −)

∀ℓ. strictTotalOrder({ a | writes(a, ℓ, −) }, mo)

∀b. rf(b) = ⊥ ⇐⇒ ∃ℓ. V. writes(a, ℓ, V), reads(b, ℓ, V), ¬hb(a, b)

∀a, b. rf(b) = a, (isNonatomic(a) ∨ isNonatomic(b)) ⇒ hb(a, b)

∀a, b. hb(a, b) ⇒

∀a, c. isUpd(c), rf(c) = a ⇒ mo(a, c), ¬hb(a, b)

∀a ≠ b, ℓ, ℓ′. A(a) = A(ℓ), A(b) = A(ℓ′) ⇒ ℓ ≠ ℓ′

where hb ≡ (sb ∪ sw)^+

sw ≡ {(a, b) | rf(a) = b, isAtomic(a), isAtomic(b)}

reads(a, ℓ, V) ≡ A(a) ∈ {R(ℓ, V, −), U(ℓ, V, −)}

writes(a, ℓ, V) ≡ A(a) ∈ {W(ℓ, V, −), U(ℓ, −, V)}

strictTotalOrder(S, R) ≡ (∀a. R(a, a)),

∀a, b, c. R(a, b), R(b, c) ⇒ R(a, c),

∀a, b ∈ S. a ≠ b ⇒ R(a, b) ∨ R(b, a)

dataRace(A, sb, mo, rf) ≡ ∃ℓ. ∃a ≠ b ∈ dom(A).

accessesLoc(a, ℓ), accessesLoc(b, ℓ), writes(a, −, −) ∨ writes(b, −, −),

isNonatomic(a) ∨ isNonatomic(b), ¬hb(a, b), ¬hb(b, a)

where hb ≡ (sb ∪ sw)^+

memoryError(A, sb, mo, rf) ≡ ∃ℓ. ∃b ∈ dom(A).

accessesLoc(b, ℓ),

∀a ∈ dom(A). A(a) = A(ℓ), ℓ ∈ ℓ′, hb(a, b)

where hb ≡ (sb ∪ sw)^+
B. Logic

B.1 Semantics and metatheory overview

Reasoning in GPS is compositional: we prove triples about each expression, and link them together using the let and fork rules. But the expression semantics is global: it assumes a whole, closed program. The semantics of GPS must bridge this gap.

This kind of gap is always present in concurrent program logics, but one normally bridges it by appeal to the heap (thereby assuming SC semantics). In particular, threads view each other’s activities through constraints on heap evolution—either simple invariants, or rely/guarantee relations—and bounding the possible heaps is all that is needed to determine e.g., what reads will return.

Fortunately, the rules of GPS point the way forward: rather than mediate thread activity through a global heap, we can understand it through the various kinds of ownership and knowledge introduced in §3, which give us a purely logical way of predicting e.g., what reads will return—a form of rely/guarantee reasoning that does not depend on a global heap. We therefore formulate a notion of local safety for a thread, which says that the actions it controls conform to its guarantee, assuming that the actions its environment controls (e.g., the contents of a read event) follow its rely. We can then easily show that the proof rules of GPS preserve local safety.

We are then left with another gap: local safety makes no reference to the C11 axioms; it instead just assumes that the events it observes obey the rely constraints. We therefore formulate a notion of global safety for an event graph, which includes a labeling of the edges of the event graph with resource/knowledge transfers from the point of view of GPS. By imposing appropriate constraints on the labeling, global safety connects the logical assumptions made in local safety with the physical reality of the event graph.

The heart of the soundness argument is then to show that if a whole program is locally safe, it is globally safe. We do this by building up the C11 event graph step-by-step (much like the expression semantics), showing for each new event that (1) the existing labeling implies the rely for the event, and (2) the event’s guarantee, which we know by local safety, implies that we can extend the labeling to include it.

Resources (§B.2) In the semantics of GPS, a resource \( r \) is a tuple \((\Pi, g, \Sigma)\) of a physical location map \( \Pi \), a ghost identity map \( g \), and known escrow set \( \Sigma \). Resources form a PCM with composition \( + \), and assertions are interpreted as sets of resources, e.g.,

\[
\exists r_1, r_2. r = r_1 + r_2, r_1 \in \llbracket P_1 \rrbracket, r_2 \in \llbracket P_2 \rrbracket
\]

The structure of resources and definition of \( + \) are designed to support the axioms on assertions we gave in §3.

Local safety (§B.3.5) With resources in hand, we can define a semantic version of ghost moves \( r \Rightarrow P \), which says that from resource \( r \) it is possible to take a ghost move to resources described by the (semantic) assertion \( P \). We can also define two functions

\[
\text{rely}, \text{guar} : \text{Resource} \times \text{Action} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\text{Resource})
\]

that describe the rely and guarantee constraints on updating resources, given that we are performing some action \( \alpha \). For example, if \( \alpha = \text{R} (\ell, V, \text{na}) \) and \( r \) claims that \( \ell \Rightarrow V' \), then

\[
\text{rely}(r, \alpha) = \text{if } V = V' \text{ then } \{ r \} \text{ else } \emptyset
\]

and similarly for atomic locations, where the protocol state is allowed to advance. We can then define local safety:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{r}_{\text{pre}} & \in \text{LSafe}_0 (e, \Phi) \triangleq \text{always} \\
\text{r}_{\text{pre}} & \in \text{LSafe}_{n+1} (e, \Phi) \approx \text{(simplified; see §B.3.5)} \\
& \text{if } e \in \text{Val} \text{ then } \text{r}_{\text{pre}} \Rightarrow \Phi (e) \\
& \text{if } e = K \lbrack \text{fork } e' \rbrack \text{ then } \text{r}_{\text{pre}} \in \text{LSafe}_n (K[0], \Phi) \ast \text{LSafe}_n (e', \text{true}) \\
& \text{if } e \triangleright e' \text{ then } \forall r \in \text{rely}(e_{\text{pre}}, \alpha), \exists P. \ r \Rightarrow P \text{ and } \\
& \forall r' \in P. \ \exists r_{\text{post}} \in \text{guar}(r', \alpha). \ r_{\text{post}} \in \text{LSafe}_n (e', \Phi)
\end{align*}
\]

which is indexed by the number of steps for which we demand safety. (An expression is “locally safe” if \( \text{LSafe}_n \) holds for all \( n \).) Local safety can be understood as giving weakest preconditions: \( \text{LSafe}_n (e, \Phi) \) is the set of starting resources for which \( e \) can safely execute for \( n \) steps with postcondition \( \Phi \) (a semantic predicate). We then define

\[
\models \{ P \} e \{ x. Q \} \triangleq \forall n, r \in \llbracket P \rrbracket. \ r \Rightarrow \text{LSafe}_n (e, \llbracket x. Q \rrbracket)
\]

Theorem 4 (Local soundness). All of the proof rules given in §3 are sound for this semantics of Hoare triples. Theorem 4 has been mechanized entirely in Coq; see \texttt{GpsLogic.v}.
Global safety (§B.4) We then define global safety $\text{GSafe}_n(T, G, L)$ over an instrumented thread pool $T$, an event graph $G$, and a labeling $L$. The instrumented thread pool maps each thread to a tuple $(a, e, r, \Phi)$ giving the thread’s last event $a$ in the graph, its continuation $e$, its current resources $r$, and its postcondition $\Phi$. Global safety at $n$ assumes that each thread is locally safe for $n$ more steps, given its resources and postcondition. The labeling $L$ annotates hb edges of the graph with resource transfers between the nodes, and is constrained to ensure that each node obeys the corresponding guar condition. Finally, the labeling must globally ensure:

- **Compatibility**: any set of concurrent resource transfers must be composable, i.e., resources are never duplicated.
- **Conformance**: if $\text{mo}(a, b)$ for two atomic writes/updates to $\ell$ with protocol $\tau$, the labeled protocol states are related by $\sqsubseteq_\tau$.

Soundness (§C) The key theorem is a kind of simulation between the expression semantics and global safety:

**Theorem 5** (Instrumented execution). If $\text{GSafe}_{n+1}(T, G, L)$ and $\langle \text{erase}(T); G \rangle \rightarrow \langle T'; G' \rangle$ then there is some $T', L'$ such that $\text{erase}(T') = T'$ and $\text{GSafe}_n(T', G', L')$.

Theorem 5 has been mechanized in Coq; see $\text{GpsAdequate.v}$ for details.

Our main result, adequacy, is an easy corollary; it connects the proof theory all the way to the C11 execution (for closed $e$):

$$\{\text{true}\} e \{x. P\} \quad \implies \quad [e] \subseteq \{V \mid \llbracket P[V/x]\rrbracket \neq \emptyset\}$$
We assume:

- The following domains, with associated metavariables:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{s} \in \text{State} && (\text{a set}) \\
\sigma \in \text{EscrowTy} && (\text{a set}) \\
\tau \in \text{ProtTy} && (\text{a set}) \\
\mu \in \text{PCMTy} && (\text{a set})
\end{align*}
\]

- For each \(\mu\), a partial commutative monoid \([\mu]\) with unit \(\varepsilon_{\mu}\), multiplication \(\cdot_{\mu}\), and a homomorphism \(-\) : \([\mu]\) \to \([\mu]\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad m \cdot_{\mu} m' &= \varepsilon_{\mu} \implies m = m' = \varepsilon_{\mu}, \\
(2) \quad m = m \cdot_{\mu} |m|, \\
(3) \quad m \cdot_{\mu} m' \leq_{\mu} m \implies |m'| = m', \text{ and} \\
(4) \quad m \cdot_{\mu} m_1 = m \cdot_{\mu} m_2 \implies |m| \cdot_{\mu} m_1 = |m| \cdot_{\mu} m_2
\end{align*}
\]

where \(m \leq_{\mu} m'\) if \(\exists m''\). \(m \cdot_{\mu} m'' = m'\).

- For each \(\tau\) a partial order \(\sqsubseteq_{\tau} \subseteq \text{State} \times \text{State}\).

### B.2.2 Domains

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi \in \text{Prot} &:= \perp \mid \text{uninit} \mid \text{na}(V) \mid \text{at}(\tau, S) \text{ where } S \in \text{Trace}(\tau) \\
r \in \text{Resource} &\triangleq \{ (\Pi, g, \Sigma) : \Pi \in \mathbb{N} \to \text{Prot}, \Sigma \subseteq \text{EscrowTy} \} \\
\text{Trace}(\tau) &\triangleq \left\{ S \subseteq \text{State} \mid S \text{ totally ordered by } \sqsubseteq_{\tau} \right\} \\
\text{Ghost} &\triangleq \left\{ g \in \prod_{\mu \in \text{PCMTy}} \mathbb{N} \to \text{[}[\mu]\text{]} \mid \forall \mu \in \text{PCMTy}. g(\mu)(n) = \varepsilon_{\mu} \text{ for infinitely many } n \right\}
\end{align*}
\]

### B.2.3 Resource composition

Protocol composition is given by the following partial commutative operator:

\[
\perp \oplus \pi = \pi \oplus \perp \triangleq \pi \\
\text{at}(\tau, S_1) \oplus \text{at}(\tau, S_2) \triangleq \text{at}(\tau, S_1 \cup S_2) \text{ when well-typed}
\]

and is lifted pointwise to protocol maps. Composition on ghosts is likewise defined pointwise.

\[
\begin{align*}
(\Pi, g, \Sigma) \oplus (\Pi', g', \Sigma') &\triangleq (\Pi \oplus \Pi', g \oplus g', \Sigma \cup \Sigma') \\
\text{emp} &\triangleq ((\lambda n. \perp), (\lambda \mu. \lambda n. \varepsilon_{\mu}), \emptyset) \\
(\Pi, g, \Sigma)[\ell := \pi] &\triangleq (\Pi[\ell := \pi], g, \Sigma) \\
r \leq r'' &\triangleq \exists r', r \oplus r' = r'' \\
r \# r' &\triangleq r \oplus r' \text{ defined}
\end{align*}
\]

### B.2.4 Resource stripping

\[
\begin{align*}
(|\Pi, g, \Sigma| &\triangleq (|\Pi|, |g|, \Sigma) \\
|g| &\triangleq \lambda \mu. \lambda n. |g(\mu)(n)| \\
|\Pi| &\triangleq \lambda \ell. \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\Pi(\ell) &\text{if } \Pi(\ell) = \text{at}(\neg, \neg) \\
\perp &\text{otherwise}
\end{array} \right. \\
\end{align*}
\]

### B.2.5 Propositions

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Prop} &\triangleq \{ \mathcal{P} \subseteq \text{Resource} \mid \forall r \in \mathcal{P}. \forall r' \# r. r \oplus r' \in \mathcal{P} \} \\
|\mathcal{P}| &\triangleq \{ r \oplus r' \mid r' \in \text{Resource} \} \\
\mathcal{P}_1 \ast \mathcal{P}_2 &\triangleq \{ r_1 \ast r_2 \mid r_1 \in \mathcal{P}_1, r_2 \in \mathcal{P}_2 \}
\end{align*}
\]

### B.2.6 Escrow and protocol type interpretations

We assume we are given the following interpretation functions:

\[
\text{interp}(\tau) \in \text{State} \times \text{Val} \to \text{Prop} \\
\text{interp}(\sigma) \in \text{Prop} \times \text{Prop}
\]

where if \(\text{interp}(\sigma) = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}')\) then \(\mathcal{P} \ast \mathcal{P} = \emptyset\).
B.3 Local safety

B.3.1 Protocols

\[ \text{at}(r, S) \sqsubseteq_{at} \text{at}(r, S') \triangleq \forall s \in S. \exists s' \in S'. s \sqsubseteq_{r} s' \]

\[ \pi \equiv_{at} \pi' \triangleq \pi \sqsubseteq_{at} \pi' \land \pi' \sqsubseteq_{at} \pi \]

\[ r_{rf} \in \text{envMove}(r, \ell, V) \triangleq \exists r, s. r_{rf} \in \text{interp}(r)(s, V), \ r[\ell] \sqsubseteq_{at} r_{rf}[\ell] \equiv_{at} \text{at}(r, \{s\}), \ r_{rf}\#r \]

\[ (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V) \triangleq \exists r, s. r_{rf} \in \text{interp}(r)(s, V), (r_{sb} \oplus r_{rf}) = r[\ell] \equiv \text{at}(r, S \cup \{s\}), \ r_{sb}[\ell] = r_{rf}[\ell] \]

\[ \text{either } r[\ell] = \text{uninit, } S = \emptyset \text{ or } r[\ell] = \text{at}(r, S), \ \forall s_0 \in S. s_0 \sqsubseteq_{r} s \]

B.3.2 Rely/guarantee

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\alpha & (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{guar}(r_{pre}, r, \alpha) \\
--- & --- & --- \\
\text{S} & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{na}(V') \implies V = V' \\
\mathcal{A}(\ell), \ell' & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = \text{uninit} & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{uninit}) \implies r_{rf} \in \text{envMove}(r, \ell, V) \\
\mathcal{R}(\ell, V, \text{na}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{na}(\ell)) \implies r_{rf} \in \text{envMove}(r, \ell, V) \\
\mathcal{R}(\ell, V, \text{at}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{at}(\ell)) \implies r_{rf} \in \text{envMove}(r, \ell, V) \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, V, \text{na}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{na}(\ell)) \implies (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ \forall r_{E} \in \text{envMove}(r_{pre}, \ell, -). r_{E}[\ell] \sqsubseteq_{at} r_{rf}[\ell] \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, V, \text{at}) & (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ r[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) & (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ r[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \end{array}
\]

B.3.3 Ghost moves

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\mathcal{R}(\ell, V, \text{na}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{na}(V') \implies V = V' \\
\mathcal{R}(\ell, V, \text{at}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{at}(\ell)) \implies r_{rf} \in \text{envMove}(r, \ell, V) \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, V, \text{na}) & r_{rf} = \text{emp}, r_{sb} = r & r[\ell] = \text{at}(\text{na}(\ell)) \implies (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ \forall r_{E} \in \text{envMove}(r_{pre}, \ell, -). r_{E}[\ell] \sqsubseteq_{at} r_{rf}[\ell] \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, V, \text{at}) & (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ r[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) & (r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{atGuar}(r, \ell, V'), \ r[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\mathcal{A}(\ell, \ell', r_{pre}, r, \alpha) \triangleq \forall i \leq n. r'[\ell] = \bot \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, -, \text{at}) & r_{pre}[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \land r'[\ell'] = \text{at}(\ell) \implies \exists r_{E} \in \text{envMove}(r_{pre}, \ell, -). r_{E}[\ell] = r'[\ell] \\
\mathcal{U}(\ell, -, -) & r_{pre}[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \implies r'[\ell'] = r_{pre}[\ell] \\
\end{array}
\]

B.3.4 Protocol equivalence for writes

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\mathcal{A}(\ell_1, \ell_n) \triangleq \text{always} \\
\mathcal{W}(\ell, -, \text{at}) & r_{pre}[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \land r'[\ell'] = \text{at}(\ell) \implies \exists r_{E} \in \text{envMove}(r_{pre}, \ell, -). r_{E}[\ell] = r'[\ell] \\
\mathcal{U}(\ell, -, -) & r_{pre}[\ell] = \text{at}(\ell) \implies r'[\ell'] = r_{pre}[\ell] \\
\end{array}
\]

B.3.5 Local safety

\[ r \in \text{LSafe}_{0}(e, \Phi) \triangleq \text{always} \]

\[ r \in \text{LSafe}_{n+1}(e, \Phi) \triangleq \]

If \( e \in \text{Val} \) then \( r \Rightarrow \Phi(e) \)

If \( e = \text{K}[\text{fork} e'] \) then \( r \in \text{LSafe}_{n}(\text{K}[0], \Phi) \ast \text{LSafe}_{n}(e', \text{true}) \)

If \( e \Rightarrow e' \) then \( \forall r_{F} \# r. \forall r_{pre} \in \text{rel}y(r \oplus r_{F}, \alpha). \exists \mathcal{P}. r_{pre} \Rightarrow \mathcal{P} \) and

\[ \forall r' \in \mathcal{P}. (r_{pre}, r') \in \text{wpe}(\alpha) \implies \exists \text{post}. (r_{post} \oplus r_{F}, -) \in \text{guar}(r_{pre}, r', \alpha), r_{post} \in \text{LSafe}_{n}(e', \Phi) \]
B.4 Global safety

B.4.1 Domains

\[ Tag(G) \triangleq \{(sb, a, b) \mid (a, b) \in G.\text{sb} \vee b = \bot\} \cup \{(esc, a, b) \mid (a, b) \in G.\text{hb} \vee b = \bot\} \]
\[ \cup \{(rf, a, b) \mid G.rf(b) = a \vee b = \bot\} \cup \{(cond, a, \bot)\} \]

\[ \mathcal{L} \in \text{Labeling}(G) \triangleq \text{Tag}(G) \rightarrow \text{Resource} \]
\[ \mathcal{I} \in \text{EscrowIntros} \triangleq \mathcal{P}_{\text{fin}}(\text{EscrowTy} \times \text{Resource}) \]
\[ \mathcal{T} \in IThreadMap \triangleq \mathbb{N} \times (\text{ActName} \times \text{Exp}) \times \text{Resource} \times (\text{Val} \rightarrow \text{Prop}) \]

B.4.2 Valid ghost moves

\[ r \Rightarrow_I r' \triangleq \exists g. r' = (r.\Pi, g, r.\Sigma \cup \{\sigma \mid (\sigma, -) \in \mathcal{I}\}) \]

B.4.3 Valid edge labels for a node

\[ b \in \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) \triangleq \exists r, \mathcal{I}. \]
\[ \mathcal{L} \in \text{Labeling}(G) \]
\[ \text{in}(sb) \oplus \text{in}(rf) \oplus \text{in}(esc) \Rightarrow_I r \oplus \text{out}(esc) \oplus \text{out}(cond) \]
\[ \text{(out(sb), out(rf))} \in \text{guar(in(sb), in(rf), r, a)} \]
\[ (\forall c \in N. \text{isUpd}(c) \land \text{rf}(c) = b \Rightarrow \mathcal{L}(rf, b, c) = \text{out}(rf)) \]
\[ (\forall c \in N. \text{isUpd}(c) \land \text{rf}(c) = b \Rightarrow \mathcal{L}(rf, b, \bot) = \text{out}(rf)) \]
\[ \mathcal{L}(rf, b, \bot) = |\text{out}(rf)| \]
\[ \forall(\sigma, r_E) \in \mathcal{I}. \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q') \Rightarrow r_E \in Q' \]
\[ \mathcal{L}(esc, b, \bot) = \bigoplus \{ r_E \mid (\sigma, r_E) \in \mathcal{I}, \text{interp}(\sigma) = (P, P'), \]
\[ r_E \in P', (\exists c. \text{hb}^+(b, c) \land \mathcal{L}(\text{cond}, c, \bot) \in P) \} \]

where

\[ G = (A, sb, mo, rf) \]
\[ \alpha \triangleq A(b) \]
\[ \text{in}(x) \triangleq \bigoplus \{ \mathcal{L}(x, a, b) \mid (x, a, b) \in \text{dom}(\mathcal{L})\} \]
\[ \text{out}(x) \triangleq \bigoplus \{ \mathcal{L}(x, b, c) \mid (x, b, c) \in \text{dom}(\mathcal{L})\} \]

B.4.4 Concurrent compatibility

\[ \text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}) \triangleq \forall \mathcal{E} \subseteq \text{dom}(\mathcal{L}). \text{tgt}(\mathcal{E}); G.\text{hb}^+ \land \text{src}(\mathcal{E}) \Rightarrow \bigoplus_{\eta \in \mathcal{E}} \mathcal{L}(\eta) \text{ defined} \]

B.4.5 Protocol conformance

\[ \text{conform}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) \triangleq \forall \ell. \forall a, b \in N. G.\text{mo}_{\ell, at}(a, b) \Rightarrow \text{out}(\mathcal{L}, a, rf)[\ell] \subseteq_{\text{at}} \text{out}(\mathcal{L}, b, rf)[\ell] \]

B.4.6 Global safety

\[ \text{GSafe}_n(\mathcal{T}, G, \mathcal{L}) \triangleq \]
\[ \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) = N \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}) \]
\[ \text{conform}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) \]
\[ \forall a \in N. \mathcal{L}(sb, a, \bot) = \bigoplus \{ r \mid \exists i. \mathcal{T}(i) = (a, -, r, -) \} \]
\[ \forall i. \mathcal{T}(i) = (a, e, r, \Phi) \Rightarrow r \in LSafe_n(e, \Phi) \]

where \( N \triangleq \text{dom}(G.A) \)
B.5 Syntax and semantics

B.5.1 Parameters

We assume:

- A syntax of states and PCM terms, with appropriate sorting rules, as part of the term syntax given below.
- A term interpretation function $[[t]]^p$ for state and PCM terms.

B.5.2 Syntax

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sort</th>
<th>$\theta ::= \text{Val} \mid \text{State} \mid \text{PCM}_\mu$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Var</td>
<td>$X ::= \ell \mid x \mid s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>$t ::= X \mid n \mid s_\mu \mid t_\mu \mid \cdots$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition</td>
<td>$P ::= t = t \mid P \land P \mid P \lor P \mid P \Rightarrow P \mid \forall X : \theta. P \mid \exists X : \theta. P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\quad \mid \Box P \mid P \ast P \mid \text{uninit}(t) \mid t \mapsto t \mid t : \ell \tau$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.5.3 Proposition semantics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$R \quad r \in [[R]]^p$</th>
<th>iff</th>
<th>$R \quad r \in [[R]]^p$</th>
<th>iff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$t = t'$</td>
<td>$[[t]]^p = [[t']]^p$</td>
<td>$\Box P$</td>
<td>$[r] \in [[P]]^p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t \sqsubseteq t'$</td>
<td>$[[t]]^p \subseteq [[t']]^p$</td>
<td>$P_1 \ast P_2$</td>
<td>$r \in [[P_1]]^p \ast [[P_2]]^p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P \land Q$</td>
<td>$r \in [[P]]^p \cap [[Q]]^p$</td>
<td>$\text{uninit}(t)$</td>
<td>$r.\Pi([[t]]^p) = \text{uninit}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P \lor Q$</td>
<td>$r \in [[P]]^p \cup [[Q]]^p$</td>
<td>$t \mapsto t'$</td>
<td>$r.\Pi([[t']]^p) = \text{na}([[t']]^p)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P \Rightarrow Q$</td>
<td>$[r] \cap [[P]]^p \subseteq [[Q]]^p$</td>
<td>$t : \ell \tau$</td>
<td>$\exists S. r.\Pi([[t]]^p) = \text{at}(\tau, S) \land [[t']]^p \in S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\forall X. P$</td>
<td>$r \in \bigcap_{d \in \text{sort}(X)} [[P]]^p[X \mapsto d]$</td>
<td>$t : t' \mu$</td>
<td>$\exists S. r.\Pi([[t]]^p) = \text{at}(\tau, S) \land [[t']]^p \in S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\exists X. P$</td>
<td>$r \in \bigcup_{d \in \text{sort}(X)} [[P]]^p[X \mapsto d]$</td>
<td>$[\sigma] \quad \sigma \in r.\Sigma$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.5.4 Ghost move semantics

$\rho \models P \Rightarrow Q \triangleq \forall r \in [[P]]^p. r \Rightarrow [[Q]]^p$

B.5.5 Hoare triple semantics

$\text{LSafe}(e. \Phi) \triangleq \bigcap_n \text{LSafe}_n(e. \varphi)$

$\rho \models \{P\} e \{x. Q\} \triangleq r \in [[P]]^p. r \Rightarrow \text{LSafe}(e. x. \Pi([[Q]]^p [x \mapsto v]))$

B.6 Proof theory

B.6.1 Necessitation

$\Box P \Rightarrow P \quad \Box P \Rightarrow \Box \Box P \quad \Box P \ast Q \Leftrightarrow \Box P \land Q \quad t = t' \Rightarrow \Box t = t'$

$\tau \Rightarrow \tau \Rightarrow [\sigma] \models [\sigma]$

B.6.2 Separation

$\ell : s \tau \ast \ell : s' \tau' \Rightarrow \tau = \tau' \land (s \sqsubseteq \tau' \ast s' \sqsubseteq \tau)$

B.6.3 Ghost moves

$\frac{P \Rightarrow Q \quad P \Rightarrow Q}{P \ast R \Rightarrow Q \ast R} \quad \frac{P \Rightarrow Q \quad Q \Rightarrow R}{P \Rightarrow R} \quad \frac{\sigma : P \Rightarrow Q \quad \sigma : P \Rightarrow Q}{\sigma : P \ast [\sigma] \Rightarrow Q} \quad \frac{P_1 \Rightarrow Q \quad P_2 \Rightarrow Q}{P_1 \lor P_2 \Rightarrow Q} \quad \frac{P \Rightarrow Q \quad \exists X. P \Rightarrow Q \quad \text{true} \Rightarrow \exists i. t_1 \mu \eta}{\forall t_F : \text{PCM}_\mu. t_1 \#_\mu t_F \Rightarrow t_2 \#_\mu t_F}$
B.6.4 Hoare logic

**Allocation**

\[
\{\text{true}\} \text{alloc}(n) \{ x. x \neq 0 \land \text{uninit}(x) \land \ldots \land \text{uninit}(x + n - 1) \} 
\]

**Acquire/release protocol rules**

\[
\forall s' \sqsupset_{\tau} s. \forall z. \tau(s', z) \land P \Rightarrow \square Q \\
\{\ell : s \vdash \tau\} [\ell]_{\text{at}} \left\{ z. \exists s'. \{\ell : s' \vdash \tau\} \land P \land \square Q \right\} \\
\{\text{uninit}(\ell) \land \tau(s, v)\} [\ell]_{\text{at}} := v \{\ell : s \vdash \tau\} \\
P \Rightarrow \tau(s'', v) \land Q \\
\forall s' \sqsupset_{\tau} s. \tau(s', -) \land P \Rightarrow s'' \sqsupset_{\tau} s' \\
\{\ell : s \vdash \tau\} [\ell]_{\text{at}} := v \{\ell : s' \vdash \tau\} \land Q \\
\forall s' \sqsupset_{\tau} s. \tau(s', v_0) \land P \Rightarrow \exists s'' \sqsupset_{\tau} s' \land \tau(s'', v_n) \land Q \\
\forall s'' \sqsupset_{\tau} s. \forall y \neq v_0. \tau(s'', y) \land P \Rightarrow \square R \\
\{\ell : s \vdash \tau\} \text{CAS}(\ell, v_0, v_n) \left\{ z. \exists s''. \{\ell : s'' \vdash \tau\} \land ((z = 1 \land Q) \lor (z = 0 \land P \land \square R)) \right\} \\
\forall s' \sqsupset_{\tau} s. \forall z. \tau(s', z) \land P \Rightarrow \exists s'' \sqsupset_{\tau} s' \land \tau(s'', (z + 1) \mod \mathbf{C}) \land Q \\
\{\ell : s \vdash \tau\} \text{FAI}(\ell) \left\{ z. \exists s''. \{\ell : s'' \vdash \tau\} \land Q \right\} 
\]

**Nonatomics**

\[
\{\text{uninit}(\ell) \lor \ell \leftrightarrow -\} [\ell]_{\text{na}} := v \{\ell \leftrightarrow v\} \\
\{\ell \leftrightarrow v\} [\ell]_{\text{na}} \{ x. x = v \land \ell \leftrightarrow v\} 
\]

**Structural rules**

\[
P' \Rightarrow P \\
\{P\} e \{x. Q\} \\
\forall x. Q \Rightarrow Q' \\
\{P\} e \{x. Q\} \\
\{P \land R\} e \{x. Q \land R\} 
\]

**Axioms for pure reductions**

\[
\begin{align*}
\{\text{true}\} \land v & \{x. x = v\} \\
\{\text{true}\} \land v + v' & \{x. x = v + v'\} \\
\{\text{true}\} \land v == v' & \{x. x = 1 \leftrightarrow v = v'\} \\
\{P \land v \neq 0\} e_1 \{x. Q\} & \{P \land v = 0\} e_2 \{x. Q\} \\
\{P\} \text{if } v \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2 \{x. Q\} \\
\{P\} e \{x. Q\} & \forall x. \{Q\} e' \{y. R\} \\
\{P\} e \{\text{true}\} & \{P\} \text{let } x = e \text{ in } e' \{y. R\} \\
\{P\} \text{fork } e \{\text{true}\} & \{P\} \text{repeat } e \text{ end } \{x. Q\} \\
\end{align*} 
\]
C. Metatheory

The metatheory of GPS has been formalized in Coq and mechanically checked. The README.txt file explains the contents of the various Coq files. Below we report on the main conceptual effort of the soundness proof: finding a decomposition of global soundness into a sequence of lemmas.

C.1 Basic properties of semantics domains and ghost moves

This subsection gives a few of the basic lemmas about our semantic domains and ghost moves. All of these claims, and many others besides, have been formalized and mechanically checked in GpsModel.v, GpsModelLemmas.v, and GpsLogic.v.

C.1.1 Resources

Lemma 1. Protocols and resources form partial commutative monoids.

Corollary 1. If \((r \oplus r')\#r''\) then \(r\#r''\).

Lemma 2. If \(r\#r'\) then \(|r \oplus r'| = |r| \oplus |r'|\).

Lemma 3. \(|r| = |r|\).

Lemma 4. \(r = r \oplus |r|\).

Lemma 5. \(|r| = |r| \oplus |r|\).

C.1.2 Propositions

Lemma 6. \([P]^P \in Prop\).

Lemma 7. Prop forms a BI algebra.

Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 1.

C.1.3 Protocols

Lemma 8. If \(\pi \sqsubseteq \pi' \sqsubseteq \pi''\) then \(\pi \sqsubseteq \pi''\).

Lemma 9. If \(\pi\#\pi_F\) then \(\pi \sqsubseteq (\pi \oplus \pi_F)\).

Lemma 10. If \(\pi \oplus \pi' = at(\tau, S)\) then either \(\pi \equiv_{at} at(\tau, S)\) or \(\pi' \equiv_{at} at(\tau, S)\).

C.1.4 Ghost moves

Lemma 11. \(r \triangleright [r]\).

Lemma 12. If \(r \triangleright P\) and \(r_F\#r\) then \(r \oplus r_F \triangleright P * [r_F]\).
C.2 Proof rules: local soundness

Theorem 6 (Local safety for ghost moves). If \( P \Rightarrow Q \) then for all closing \( \rho \) we have \( \rho \models P \Rightarrow Q \).

Proof. Checked entirely in Coq; see \texttt{GpsLogic.v}.

Theorem 7 (Local safety for Hoare triples). If \( \{ P \} e \{ x. Q \} \) then for all closing \( \rho \) we have \( \rho \models \{ P \} e \{ x. Q \} \).

Proof. Checked entirely in Coq; see \texttt{GpsLogic.v}.

C.3 Global soundness

The proof of global soundness breaks into two pieces:

- First, we prove a sequence of easy “visibility” lemmas: given that we know global safety for a graph constructed so far, resource knowledge at any point in the graph connects to some associated fact about happens-before visibility. For example, if a given node \( b \) claims to know that an atomic location \( \ell \) is in a particular state \( s \), then there must be some node \( a \) such that \( G.hb(a, b) \) and \( a \) wrote to \( \ell \) while moving to \( s \). These lemmas are given in section C.3.1.

- Second, we prove a sequence of lemmas that lead to the main instrumented step theorem (Theorem 8). Each of these lemmas accounts for a piece of the definition of local safety: rely (§C.3.2), ghost moves (§C.3.3), protocol equivalence for writes (§C.3.4) and guarantee (§C.3.5). We set up (“prepare”) for taking a step with a final lemma in section C.3.6. Each of these lemmas takes an existing labeling of the graph and transforms it by labelling the associated edges:
  - Step preparation: labels the incoming \( sb \) edge
  - Rely: labels any incoming \( rf \) edges
  - Ghost: labels \( hb \) edges for all escrow-related activity, including transferring the escrowed resource and consuming the escrow condition
  - Guarantee: labels the outgoing \( sb \) and \( rf \) edges.

Outgoing resources from a new node initially go to a sink node \( \perp \). These resources are subsequently moved to label e.g., \( rf \) edges as further nodes are added to the graph.

C.3.1 Visibility

Definition 1. We say that a set of nodes \( N \subseteq \text{dom}(G.A) \) is \( G \)-prefix closed (written \( N \in \text{prefix}(G) \)) if for all \( b \in N \) and all \( a \in \text{dom}(G.A) \), \( G.hb(a, b) \) implies that \( a \in N \).

Lemma 13 (Allocation visibility). If

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{consistentC11}(G) \\
N \in \text{prefix}(G) \\
N \cup \{b\} \in \text{prefix}(G) \\
N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L, N') \\
in(L, b, all)[\ell] \neq \perp
\end{align*}
\]

then \( \exists a. \\
G.hb(a, b) \\
G.A(a) = A(\vec{\ell}) \\
\ell \in \vec{\ell}
\)

Proof. See \texttt{visible_allocation} in \texttt{GpsVisible.v}.
Lemma 14 (Nonatomic protocol visibility). If

\[ \text{consistentC11}(G) \]
\[ N \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \cup \{b\} \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L, N') \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, L) \]
\[ \text{in}(L, b, \text{all})[\ell] = \text{na}(V) \]

then \( \exists a. \)
\[ G.\text{hb}(a, b) \]
\[ G.A(a) = W(\ell, V, \text{na}) \]
\[ \forall a' \in N. G.A(a') = W(\ell, -, -) \implies (G.\text{hb}^=(b, a') \lor G.\text{hb}^=(a', a)) \]

Proof. See \texttt{visible\_na} in \texttt{GpsVisible.v}.

Lemma 15 (Uninitialized visibility). If

\[ \text{consistentC11}(G) \]
\[ N \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \cup \{b\} \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L, N') \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, L) \]
\[ \text{in}(L, b, \text{all})[\ell] = \text{uninit} \]
\[ a \in N \]
\[ G.A(a) = W(\ell, -, -) \]

then
\[ G.\text{hb}^=(b, a) \]

Proof. See \texttt{visible\_uninit} in \texttt{GpsVisible.v}.

Lemma 16 (Atomic protocol visibility). If

\[ \text{consistentC11}(G) \]
\[ N \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \cup \{b\} \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L, N') \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, L) \]
\[ \text{in}(L, b, \text{all})[\ell] = \text{at}(-) \]

then \( \exists a, S'. \)
\[ G.\text{hb}(a, b) \]
\[ \text{writes}(G.A(a), \ell, -) \]
\[ \text{isAtomic}(a) \]
\[ \text{out}(L, a, \text{sb})[\ell] \equiv\text{at}\text{ in}(L, b, \text{all})[\ell] \]

Proof. See \texttt{visible\_atomic} in \texttt{GpsVisible.v}.
Lemma 17 (Escrow visibility). If

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{consistentC11}(G) \\
&N \in \text{prefix}(G) \\
&N \cup \{b\} \in \text{prefix}(G) \\
&N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, N') \\
&\text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}) \\
&\sigma \in \text{in}(\mathcal{L}, b, \text{all}).\Sigma
\end{align*}
\]

then \(\exists a.
\begin{align*}
&G.\text{hb}(a, b) \\
&\sigma \notin \text{in}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}).\Sigma \\
&\sigma \in \text{out}(\mathcal{L}, b, \text{all}).\Sigma
\end{align*}
\]

\[\Box\]
C.3.2 Rely

Lemma 18 (Rely step). If
\[
G.A(a) = \alpha \\
\text{dom}(G.A) = N \cup \{a\} \\
N \in \text{prefix}(G) \\
N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) \\
\text{in}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}) = \text{out}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}) = \text{emp} \\
\text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}) \\
\text{conform}(G, \mathcal{L}, N) \\
\text{consistentC11}(G) \\
\text{in}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{rf}) = \text{emp} \\
\text{in}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{esc}) = \text{emp} \\
\text{out}(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}) = \text{emp}
\]
then \(\exists \mathcal{L}'\).
\[
N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G.A)) \\
\text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}') \\
\text{conform}(G, \mathcal{L}', N) \\
\text{in}(\mathcal{L}', a, \text{sb}) \oplus \text{in}(\mathcal{L}', a, \text{rf}) \in \text{rely}(\text{in}(\mathcal{L}', a, \text{sb}), \alpha) \\
\text{in}(\mathcal{L}', a, \text{esc}) = \text{out}(\mathcal{L}', a, \text{all}) = \text{emp} \\
\forall b, c. \mathcal{L}'(\text{sb}, b, c) = \mathcal{L}(\text{sb}, b, c) \\
\forall b. \mathcal{L}'(\text{sb}, b, \perp) = \mathcal{L}(\text{sb}, b, \perp)
\]

Proof. See rely_step in GpsRelyGhost.v.
C.3.3 Ghost moves

Lemma 19 (Ghost step). If

\[ \text{dom}(G.A) = N \uplus \{ a \} \]
\[ \text{consistentC11}(G) \]
\[ N \in \text{prefix}(G) \]
\[ N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L, \text{dom}(G.A)) \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, L[(\text{esc}, a, \bot)] := L(\text{esc}, a, \bot) \oplus r]) \]
\[ \text{conform}(G, L, N) \]
\[ r_{\text{before}} \triangleq \text{in}(L, a, \text{sb}) \oplus \text{in}(L, a, \text{rf}) \oplus \text{in}(L, a, \text{esc}) \]
\[ r_{\text{after}} \triangleq r \oplus \text{out}(L, a, \text{esc}) \oplus \text{out}(L, a, \text{cond}) \]
\[ r_{\text{before}} \Rightarrow r_{\text{after}} \]
\[ |r_0| \leq r \]
\[ \forall c. \ L'(\text{esc}, a, c) = \text{emp} \]
\[ \forall (\sigma, r_E) \in I. \ \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q') \implies r_E \in Q' \]
\[ L(\text{esc}, a, \bot) = \oplus \left\{ r_E \mid \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q'), r_E \in Q', \ (\not\exists b. \ h_b^-(a, b) \land L(\text{cond}, b, \bot) \in \mathcal{Q}) \right\} \]

then \( \exists L', \mathcal{I}', r', r'_{\text{before}}, r'_{\text{after}} \in \mathcal{P}. \)

\[ N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, L', \text{dom}(G.A)) \]
\[ \text{compat}(G, L'[(\text{esc}, a, \bot)] := L'(\text{esc}, a, \bot) \oplus r')) \]
\[ \text{conform}(G, L', N) \]
\[ r'_{\text{before}} \triangleq \text{in}(L', a, \text{sb}) \oplus \text{in}(L', a, \text{rf}) \oplus \text{in}(L', a, \text{esc}) \]
\[ r'_{\text{after}} \triangleq r' \oplus \text{out}(L', a, \text{esc}) \oplus \text{out}(L', a, \text{cond}) \]
\[ r'_{\text{before}} \Rightarrow r'_{\text{after}} \]
\[ \forall b. \ L'(\text{sb}, b, \bot) = L(\text{sb}, b, \bot) \]
\[ \forall b. \ L'(\text{rf}, b, \bot) = L(\text{rf}, b, \bot) \]
\[ \forall b, c. \ L'(\text{sb}, b, c) = L(\text{sb}, b, c) \]
\[ \forall b, c. \ L'(\text{rf}, b, c) = L(\text{rf}, b, c) \]
\[ \forall c. \ L(\text{esc}, a, c) = \text{emp} \]
\[ \forall (\sigma, r_E) \in I'. \ \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q') \implies r_E \in Q' \]
\[ L(\text{esc}, a, \bot) = \oplus \left\{ r_E \mid (\sigma, r_E) \in I', \ \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q'), r_E \in Q', \ (\not\exists b. \ h_b^-(a, b) \land L(\text{cond}, b, \bot) \in \mathcal{Q}) \right\} \]

Proof. See ghost_step in GpsRelyGhost.v.
C.3.4 Protocol equivalence for writes

Lemma 20 (Protocol equivalence for writes). If

dom(G.A) = N \cup \{a\}
consistentC11(G)
N \in \text{prefix}(G)
N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, \text{dom}(G.A))
in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{sb}) \oplus in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{rf}) \in \text{rely}(in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{sb}), a)
compat(G, \mathcal{L}[(\text{esc}, a, \bot) := \mathcal{L}(\text{esc}, a, \bot) \oplus r])
conform(G, \mathcal{L}, N)
in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}) \Rightarrow r \oplus out(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{esc}) \oplus out(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{cond})
|in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{sb}) \oplus in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{rf})| \leq r

then

(in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{sb}) \oplus in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{rf}), in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all})) \in \text{wpe}(G.A(a))

Proof. See \text{pwpe} in \text{GpsGuarPrep.v} and \text{wpe} in \text{GpsGuarPrep.v}.

C.3.5 Guarantee

Lemma 21 (Guar step). If

\alpha = G.A(a)
dom(G.A) = N \cup \{a\}
N \in \text{prefix}(G)
N \subseteq \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}, \text{dom}(G.A))
consistentC11(G)
compat(G, \mathcal{L}[(\text{esc}, a, \bot) := \mathcal{L}(\text{esc}, a, \bot) \oplus r])
conform(G, \mathcal{L}, N)
r_{\text{pre}} = in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{sb}) \oplus in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{rf})
r_{\text{pre}} \in \text{rely}(\neg, a)
in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}) \Rightarrow r \oplus out(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{esc}) \oplus out(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{cond})
\forall(\sigma, r_E) \in \mathcal{T}. \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q') \Longrightarrow r_E \in Q'
\mathcal{L}(\text{esc}, a, \bot) = \bigoplus \left\{ r_E \mid (\sigma, r_E) \in \mathcal{T}. \text{interp}(\sigma) = (Q, Q'), r_E \in Q' \right\}
|in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all})| \leq r
out(\mathcal{L}, b, \text{rf}) = \text{emp}
out(\mathcal{L}, b, \text{sb}) = \text{emp}
(r_{sb}, r_{rf}) \in \text{guar}(r_{\text{pre}}, r, \alpha)
\text{wpe}(\alpha, r_{\text{pre}}, in(\mathcal{L}, a, \text{all}))

then \exists \mathcal{L}'.

dom(G.A) = \text{valid}(G, \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G.A))
compat(G, \mathcal{L}')
conform(G, \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G.A))
\forall b \neq a. \mathcal{L}'(sb, b, \bot) = \mathcal{L}(sb, b, \bot)
\mathcal{L}'(sb, a, \bot) = r_{sb}

Proof. See \text{guar\_step} in \text{GpsGuarPrep.v}.
C.3.6 Step preparation

**Lemma 22** (Step preparation). If

\[
\text{consistentC11}(G) \\
\text{consistentC11}(G') \\
\text{dom}(G'.A) = \text{dom}(G.A) \cup \{b\} \\
\mathcal{L}(sb, a, \bot) = r \oplus r_{\text{rem}} \\
\text{dom}(G') \subseteq \text{valid}(G', \mathcal{L}, \text{dom}(G.A)) \\
\text{compat}(G, \mathcal{L}) \\
\text{conform}(G, \mathcal{L}, \text{dom}(G)) \\
\forall c \in \text{dom}(G.A). G.A(c) = G'.A(c) \\
G'.sb = G.sb \cup \{a, b\} \\
\forall c \in \text{dom}(G.A). G.rf(c) = G'.rf(c) \\
G'.mo \supseteq G.mo
\]

then \(\exists \mathcal{L}'\).

\[
\text{valid}(G', \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G.A)) = \text{dom}(G) \\
\text{compat}(G', \mathcal{L}') \\
\text{conform}(G', \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G')) \\
\mathcal{L}'(sb, a, \bot) = r_{\text{rem}} \\
in(\mathcal{L}', b, sb) = r \\
in(\mathcal{L}', b, rf) = \text{emp} \\
in(\mathcal{L}', b, esc) = \text{emp} \\
\forall a' \neq a. \mathcal{L}'(sb, a', b) = \text{emp} \\
\text{out}(\mathcal{L}', b, all) = \text{emp} \\
\forall a' \neq a. \mathcal{L}'(sb, a', \bot) = \mathcal{L}(sb, a', \bot)
\]

\textbf{Proof.} See \texttt{prepare_step} in GpsGuarPrep.v.

C.3.7 Instrumented execution and adequacy

We define functions \(\text{erase} : \text{IThreadMap} \rightarrow \text{ThreadMap}\) and \(\text{post} : \text{IThreadMap} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow \text{Val} \rightarrow \text{Prop}\) as follows:

\[
\text{erase}(T) \triangleq \lambda i. \text{if } T(i) = (a, e, -, -) \text{ then } (a, e) \text{ else } -(a, e, a', b) \\
\text{post}(T) \triangleq \lambda i. \text{if } T(i) = (--, --, p) \text{ then } (p, p, a', b)
\]

\textbf{Theorem 8} (Instrumented execution). If \(\text{GSafe}_{n+1}(T, G, \mathcal{L}, \text{dom}(G.A))\) and \(\langle \text{erase}(T); G \rangle \rightarrow \langle T'; G' \rangle\) then there exist \(T', \mathcal{L}'\) such that \(\text{erase}(T') = T'\) and \(\text{GSafe}_n(T', G', \mathcal{L}', \text{dom}(G'.A))\) and \(\text{post}(T) \subseteq \text{post}(T')\).

\textbf{Proof.} See \texttt{gsafe_pres} in GpsAdequate.v.

\textbf{Theorem 9} (Adequacy). If \(e\) is closed and \(\{\text{true}\} e \{x. P\}\) then \(\|e\| \subseteq \{V \mid \|P\|^{\{x \rightarrow V\}} \neq \emptyset\}\).

\textbf{Proof.} See \texttt{adequacy} in GpsAdequate.v.
D. Examples

D.1 One-shot message passing

D.1.1 Code

\begin{verbatim}
let x = alloc(1) in
let y = alloc(1) in
[x] na := 0;
[y] at := 0;
fork ([x] na := 37; [y] at := 1);
repeat [y] at end;
[x] na
\end{verbatim}

D.1.2 Proof setup

A ghost PCM for tokens

We set up a ghost PCM named Token with carrier \( \mathbb{P}(\{1\}) \) and \( \uplus \) as composition. Let \( \odot \) denote \( \{1\} \).

Escrows

We define a single escrow, \( XE(\gamma, x) \), as follows:

\[ XE(\gamma, x) : \{\gamma \odot \} \leadsto x \mapsto 37 \]

Protocols

We define a single protocol, \( YP(\gamma, x) \), with states 0 and 1 and transition relation \( \leq \). State interpretations are as follows:

\[ YP(\gamma, x)(0, z) \triangleq z = 0 \]
\[ YP(\gamma, x)(1, z) \triangleq z = 1 * [XE(\gamma, x)] \]
D.1.3 Verification

\[
\{ \text{true} \} \\
\{ \exists \gamma. \gamma : \emptyset \} \\
\]

let \( x = \text{alloc}(1) \) in

\[
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * \text{uninit}(x) \\
\]

let \( y = \text{alloc}(1) \) in

\[
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * \text{uninit}(x) * \text{uninit}(y) \\
\]

\( [x]_{\text{na}} := 0; \)

\[
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * x \mapsto 0 * \text{uninit}(y) \\
\]

\( [y]_{\text{at}} := 0; \)

\[
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * x \mapsto 0 * \{ y : 0 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \\
\]

fork

\[
\{ x \mapsto 0 * \{ y : 0 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \} \\
\]

\( [x]_{\text{na}} := 37; \)

\[
\{ x \mapsto 37 * y : 0 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \\
\{ \text{XE}(\gamma, x) \} * y : 0 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \\
\]

\( [y]_{\text{at}} := 1; \)

\[
\{ y : 1 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \\
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * y : 0 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) \\
\]

repeat \( [y]_{\text{at}} \) end:

\[
\{ \gamma : \emptyset \} * y : 1 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) * \{ \text{XE}(\gamma, x) \} \\
\{ y : 1 \} \text{YP}(\gamma, x) * x \mapsto 37 \\
\]

\( [x]_{\text{na}} \)

\[
\{ z. z = 37 \} \\
\]
D.2 Spinlocks

D.2.1 Parameters

Fix some assertion $P$ for the resources protected by the lock.

D.2.2 Code

\[
\text{newLock } \triangleq \\
\begin{align*}
\text{let } x = \text{alloc}(1) \text{ in} \\
[x]_{\text{at}} := 1; \\
x \\
\text{spin}(x) \triangleq \\
\text{repeat } [x]_{\text{at}} \text{ end} \\
\text{lock}(x) \triangleq \\
\text{repeat } \text{spin}(x); \text{CAS}(x, 1, 0) \text{ end} \\
\text{unlock}(x) \triangleq \\
[x]_{\text{at}} := 1
\end{align*}
\]

D.2.3 Proof setup

**Top-level spec**

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ P \} \text{ newLock } \{ x. \Box \text{isLock}(x) \} \\
\{ \text{isLock}(x) \} \text{ lock}(x) \{ P \} \\
\{ \text{isLock}(x) \ast P \} \text{ unlock}(x) \{ \text{true} \}
\end{align*}
\]

**Protocols** We assume a protocol $\text{LP}$ with a single state $\text{Inv}$, interpreted as follows:

\[
\text{LP}(\text{inv, } x) \triangleq (x = 1 \ast P) \lor x = 0
\]

**High-level predicates**

\[
\text{isLock}(x) \triangleq x : \text{inv} \downarrow \text{LP}
\]
D.2.4 Verification of newLock

\( \{ P \} \)

let \( x = \text{alloc}(1) \) in

\( \{ P \star \text{uninit}(x) \} \)

\( [x]_{\text{at}} := 1; \)

\( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \)

\( x \)

\( \{ \square(\text{isLock}(x)) \} \)

D.2.5 Verification of spin

\( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \) repeat \( [x]_{\text{at}} \) end \( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \)

D.2.6 Verification of lock

\( \{ \text{isLock}(x) \} \)

\( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \)

repeat \( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \)

spin(\( x \));

\( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \} \)

\( \text{CAS}(x, 1, 0) \)

\( \{ z. \ x : \text{Inv LP} \star (z = \text{true} \Rightarrow P) \} \)

end

\( \{ P \} \)

D.2.7 Verification of unlock

\( \{ \text{isLock}(x) \star P \} \)

\( \{ x : \text{Inv LP} \star P \} \)

\( [x]_{\text{at}} := 1 \)

\( \{ \text{true} \} \)
D.3 Ernie Cohen's lock example

D.3.1 Parameters

Fix some assertion $P$ for the resources to be raced for.

D.3.2 Code

\[
\begin{align*}
[x]_\text{at} &: = \text{choose}(1, 2); \\
\text{repeat } [y]_\text{at} \text{ end; } & \quad [y]_\text{at} : = \text{choose}(1, 2); \\
\text{if } [x]_\text{at} &= [y]_\text{at} \text{ then } & \quad \text{if } [x]_\text{at} != [y]_\text{at} \text{ then } \\
\text{/* critical section */} & \quad \text{/* critical section */}
\end{align*}
\]

D.3.3 Proof setup

Protocols

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Choice}(\gamma)(s, z) & \triangleq s = z \ast (s = 0 \lor \text{fork})
\end{align*}
\]

Escrows We have an escrow type $\text{PE}(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ for the resource $P$:

\[
\text{PE}(\gamma^x, \gamma^y) : \exists i, j > 0. \ [x : i] \ast [y : j] \ast \left( \begin{array}{c}
\gamma^x : 0 \ast i = j \\
\gamma^y : 0 \ast i \neq j
\end{array} \right) \rightsquigarrow P
\]

D.3.4 Proof

\[
\begin{align*}
\{P\} \\
\text{let } x = \text{alloc}(1) \\
\{P \ast \text{uninit}(x)\} \\
\text{let } y = \text{alloc}(1) \\
\{P \ast \text{uninit}(x) \ast \text{uninit}(y)\} \\
\{P \ast \text{uninit}(x) \ast \text{uninit}(y) \ast \exists \gamma_1^x, \gamma_2^x, \gamma_1^y, \gamma_2^y, \gamma_1^\gamma, \gamma_2^\gamma \ast \gamma^x : 0 \ast \gamma^y : 0 \ast \gamma^\gamma : 0 \ast \text{□}(\text{PE}(\gamma_1^x, \gamma_1^y))\} \\
[x]_\text{at} = 0 \\
\{\text{uninit}(y) \ast \gamma_1^x : 0 \ast \gamma_2^x : 0 \ast \gamma_1^y : 0 \ast \gamma_2^y : 0 \ast \text{□}(x : 0 \text{ Choice}(\gamma_2))\} \\
[y]_\text{at} = 0 \\
\{\gamma_1^x : 0 \ast \gamma_2^x : 0 \ast \gamma_1^y : 0 \ast \gamma_2^y : 0 \ast \gamma^\gamma : 0 \ast \text{□}(y : 0 \text{ Choice}(\gamma_1^x))\} \\
[x]_\text{at} = \text{choose}(1, 2); \\
\{\gamma_1^x : 0 \ast \gamma_2^x : 0 \ast \exists i > 0. \ [x : i] \text{ Choice}(\gamma_2)\} \\
\text{repeat } [y]_\text{at} \text{ end; } & \quad [y]_\text{at} = \text{choose}(1, 2); \\
\{\gamma_1^y : 0 \ast \gamma_1^\gamma : 0 \ast \exists j > 0. \ [y : j] \text{ Choice}(\gamma_2)\} \\
\text{if } [x]_\text{at} &= [y]_\text{at} \text{ then } & \quad \text{if } [x]_\text{at} != [y]_\text{at} \text{ then } \\
\{\gamma_1^y : 0 \ast \gamma_1^\gamma : 0 \ast i = j\} & \quad \{\gamma_1^y : 0 \ast \gamma_1^\gamma : 0 \ast i \neq j\} \\
\{P\} & \quad \{P\} \\
\text{/* critical section */} & \quad \text{/* critical section */}
\end{align*}
\]
D.4 Michael-Scott queue

The Michael-Scott queue [28] is a classic lock-free queue implementation. The queue is represented as a linked list; each node has a data component and a link component, which is 0 for the final node. The head of the linked list is always a sentinel node, which means that the list itself is never empty. The queue uses two additional pointers: head and tail. In general, head points to the sentinel node, while tail points to a node from which the real tail is always reachable. (The tail pointer is just an optimization to make it quicker to find the real tail.) The “real” tail is the unique node reachable from head with a 0 link component. Elements are dequeued by updating head, and enqueued by updating the real tail’s link pointer (after which the enqueuer attempts to update the lagging tail pointer).

D.4.1 Code

Let head = 0, tail = 1, data = 0, link = 1. We will use these values as field offsets.

```plaintext
newBuffer ≜ let s = alloc(2) /* initial sentinel node */
[s + link]₀ := 0;
let q = alloc(2); /* queue = head and tail pointers */
[q + head]₀ := s;
[q + tail]₀ := s;
q

findTail(q) ≜
let n = [q + tail]₀
let n' = [n + link]₀
if n' == 0 then n
else [q + tail]₀ := n'; 0

tryEnq(q, x) ≜
let n = alloc(2);
[n + data]₀ := x;
[n + link]₀ := 0;
let t = repeat findTail(q) end
if CAS(t + link, 0, n)
    then [q + tail]₀ := n; 1
else 0

tryDeq(q) ≜
let s = [q + head]₀
let n = [s + link]₀
if n == 0 then 0
else if CAS(q + head, s, n) then [n + data]₀
else 0
```

Note that the use of release-acquire operations causes the Michael-Scott queue to exhibit behavior that is not sequentially consistent. This places it out of reach for the type of verification methods (mentioned in Section §5.3) that recover SC reasoning by demanding the use of strong synchronization disciplines. In particular, suppose we have two queues, q and r, both initially empty, and then we run the following:

```
repeat tryEnq(q, 1) end;  ||  repeat tryEnq(r, 2) end;
let x = tryDeq(r)  ||  let y = tryDeq(q)
```

Using our release-acquire implementation of the queue, there is an execution in which both threads return $x = y = 0$ (i.e., observing each other’s queue to be empty). But that is not a possible SC execution. This is really just a simple encoding of the canonical example where release-acquire differs from SC, but lifted to a higher-level data structure rather than just using primitive reads/writes.
D.4.2 Proof setup

We use the same spec as for the circular buffer, so we fix an arbitrary per-element predicate \( P(x) \) which we will ensure holds on enqueue and dequeue.

\[
\{ \text{true} \} \text{newBuffer}(q) \{ q, \Box \text{Queue}(q) \}
\]

\[
\{ \text{Queue}(q) \ast P(x) \} \text{tryEnq}(q,x) \{ z. z \neq 0 \lor P(x) \}
\]

\[
\{ \text{Queue}(q) \} \text{tryDeq}(q) \{ x. x = 0 \lor P(x) \}
\]

One can imagine richer specs for the queue—in the extreme, a contextual refinement property [37]—but we use this per-item spec for simplicity in showing the structure and style of a typical correctness proof.

Ultimately, this queue spec allows one thread to enqueue \( x \) by giving up resources \( P(x) \), while another thread gains those resources upon dequeueing the node. The challenge is that the enqueuer and dequeuer perform CASes on distinct locations (the real tail’s \textit{link} pointer and the \textit{head} pointer, respectively), which must thereby be governed by distinct protocols while still supporting this resource transfer. This is a case of a mix between explicit and implicit synchronization, and as such we use \textit{both} the CAS rule and escrows to perform the resource transfer.

The key idea for the proof is to use tokens to represent logical dequeue permissions. The protocol for the \textit{head} pointer always keeps the permission to dequeue from the sentinel; a dequeuing thread gains control of this token when CASing the \textit{head} pointer.

Then, each node’s \textit{link} pointer is governed by a protocol that includes knowledge of an escrow, \( \text{DEQ}(\ell, \gamma, \gamma') \), defined as follows:

\[
\text{DEQ}(\ell, \gamma, \gamma'): \begin{align*}
\gamma: & \xrightarrow{} \exists x. \ell \rightarrow x \ast P(x) \ast \gamma' \\
\ell + \text{link}: & \text{Null}
\end{align*}
\]

This escrow says that the (unique) owner of the token instance \( \gamma \) can exchange that token for (1) ownership of \( \ell \), (2) ownership of the associated \( P(x) \) and (3) ownership of the token \( \gamma' \), which intuitively represents the token for the next node.

To see how the proof fits together, we need to consider the protocols involved. We have a protocol \( \text{Link}(\gamma) \) for \textit{link} pointers with states \{Null, Linked(\ell)\} and transitions from Null to Linked(\ell) for any \( \ell \) (plus the usual reflexive, transitive closure), with state interpretations:

\[
\text{Link}(\gamma)(\text{Null},x) \triangleq x = 0
\]

\[
\text{Link}(\gamma)(\text{Linked}(\ell),x) \triangleq x = \ell \neq 0 \ast \exists \gamma'. [\text{DEQ}(\ell + \text{data}, \gamma, \gamma')] \ast \ell + \text{link}: \text{Null} \mid \text{Link}(\gamma')
\]

Notice that, in order to enqueue a new node (by changing from Null to Linked), a thread must create an associated escrow, which requires the thread to give up the appropriate \( P(x) \) and to create a token \( \gamma' \) for eventually dequeuing that new node.

We also have two protocols, \( \text{Head} \) and \( \text{Tail} \), each with a single state called \textit{Inv}, interpreted as:

\[
\text{Head}(\text{Inv},x) \triangleq \exists \gamma. x + \text{link}: \text{Null} \mid \text{Link}(\gamma) + \gamma'
\]

\[
\text{Tail}(\text{Inv},x) \triangleq \exists \gamma. x + \text{link}: \text{Null} \mid \text{Link}(\gamma)
\]

The \textit{Head} protocol constrains the \textit{link} pointer of the sentinel node and, crucially, maintains ownership of the associated token necessary to open its escrow.

Thus, in all, the various physical protocols of the queue are connected in part through a chain of escrows and token ownership which ultimately mediates the resource transfer from enqueuers to dequeuers.

Finally, we define a top-level predicate for the queue:

\[
\text{Queue}(q) \triangleq q + \text{head}: \text{Inv} \mid \text{Head} \ast q + \text{tail}: \text{Inv} \mid \text{Tail}
\]
D.4.3 Verification of newBuffer

\{
\text{true}
\}
\{
\exists \gamma. \quad \gamma : \diamond
\}

let \( s = \text{alloc}(2) \)

\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{uninit}(s + \text{data}) \ast \text{uninit}(s + \text{link})
\}
\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{uninit}(s + \text{link})
\}    \quad /\text{leak memory}/

\[(s + \text{link})_{\text{at}} := 0;\]
\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{uninit}(s + \text{link})\}

let \( q = \text{alloc}(2); \)

\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{uninit}(q + \text{head}) \ast \text{uninit}(q + \text{tail})
\}

\[
(q + \text{head})_{\text{at}} := s;
\]
\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{null} \ast \text{null}
\}

\[
(q + \text{head})_{\text{at}} := q + \text{head};\]
\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{null} \ast \text{null}
\}

\[
(q + \text{tail})_{\text{at}} := s;
\]
\{
\gamma : \diamond \quad \ast \text{null} \ast \text{null}
\}

\[
q
\]
\{
q. \quad \Box\text{Queue}(q)
\}

D.4.4 Verification of findTail

\{\Box(\text{Queue}(q))\}
\{
q + \text{tail} : \ast \text{null}
\}

let \( n = [q + \text{tail}]_{\text{at}} \)

\{\Box(\exists \gamma. \quad n + \text{link} : \text{null} \ast \text{null})\}

let \( n' = [n + \text{link}]_{\text{at}} \)

\{n' \neq 0 \Rightarrow \exists \gamma'. \quad n' + \text{link} : \text{null} \ast \text{null}\}

if \( n' = 0 \) then

\{\text{true}\}

\[
n
\]
\{n. \quad \Box\text{Queue}(q) \ast \exists \gamma. \quad n + \text{link} : \text{null} \ast \text{null}\}

else

\{\exists \gamma'. \quad n' + \text{link} : \text{null} \ast \text{null}\}

\[
(q + \text{tail})_{\text{at}} := n';
\]
\{\text{true}\}

\[
0
\]
\{z. \quad z = 0 \ast \Box\text{Queue}(q)\}
D.4.5 Verification of tryEnq

\[
\{ P(x) \triangleq (\text{Queue}(q)) \} \\
\]

let \( n = \text{alloc}(2); \)
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright \text{uninit}(n + \text{data}) \triangleright \text{uninit}(n + \text{link}) \triangleright \Box(n \neq 0) \} \\
\]
\[
[n + \text{data}]_{\text{at}} := x; \]
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright (n + \text{data}) \mapsto x \triangleright \text{uninit}(n + \text{link}) \} \\
\]
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright (n + \text{data}) \mapsto x \triangleright \text{uninit}(n + \text{link}) \triangleright \exists \gamma'. \Diamond \gamma'. \} \\
\]
\[
[n + \text{link}]_{\text{at}} := 0; \]
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright (n + \text{data}) \mapsto x \triangleright n + \text{link} : \text{Null} \text{Link}(\gamma') \triangleright \Diamond \gamma'. \} \\
\]
\[
\text{let } t = \text{repeat findTail}(q) \text{ end} \]
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright (n + \text{data}) \mapsto x \triangleright n + \text{link} : \text{Null} \text{Link}(\gamma') \triangleright \Diamond \gamma'. \} \\
\]
if CAS(t + \text{link}, 0, n) then
\[
\{ t + \text{link} : \text{Linked}(n) \left| \text{Link}(\gamma') \right. \triangleright n + \text{link} : \text{Null} \text{Link}(\gamma') \} \\
\]
\[
\{ n + \text{link} : \text{Null} \text{Link}(\gamma') \triangleright q + \text{tail} : \text{Inv} \text{Tail} \} \\
\]
\[
[q + \text{tail}]_{\text{at}} := n; \]
\[
\{ \text{true} \} \\
\]
\[
\{ z, z = 1 \} \\
\]
else
\[
\{ P(x) \triangleright t + \text{link} : \text{Null} \text{Link}(\gamma') \} \\
\]
\[
0 \\
\]
\[
\{ z, z = 0 \triangleright P(x) \} \\
\]
D.4.6 Verification of tryDeq

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{Queue}(q) \} \\
\{ \Box (q \text{ } \text{head} : \text{Inv Head}) \} \\
\text{let } s = [q \text{ } \text{head} | _{\text{at}}] \\
\{ \exists \gamma. \exists s \text{ } \text{link} : \text{Null Link}(\gamma) \} \\
\text{let } n = [s \text{ } \text{link} | _{\text{at}}] \\
\{ n \neq 0 \Rightarrow \exists \gamma'. [\text{DEQ}(n + \text{data}, \gamma, \gamma')] * [n \text{ } \text{link} : \text{Null Link}(\gamma')] \} \\
\text{if } n == 0 \text{ then} \\
\{ \text{true} \} \\
\{ x. x = 0 \} \\
\text{else} \\
\{ q \text{ } \text{head} : \text{Inv Head} * [\text{DEQ}(n + \text{data}, \gamma, \gamma')] * [n \text{ } \text{link} : \text{Null Link}(\gamma')] \} \\
\text{if CAS}(q \text{ } \text{head}, s, n) \text{ then} \\
\{ q \text{ } \text{head} : \text{Inv Head} * \exists x. n + \text{data} \leftarrow x * \text{P}(x) \} \\
|n + \text{data}|_{\text{na}} \\
\{ x. \text{P}(x) \} \\
\text{else} \\
\{ q \text{ } \text{head} : \text{Inv Head} \} \\
0 \\
\{ x. x = 0 \} 
\end{align*}
\]
D.5 Circular buffer

D.5.1 Parameters

- Fix some choice of buffer size \( N > 1 \); the actual capacity is \( N - 1 \).
- Fix some per-element predicate \( P(x) \).

Let \( wi = 0, ri = 1, b = 2 \). We will use these values as field offsets.

D.5.2 Code

Based on circular buffers from the Linux kernel [19].

```plaintext
newBuffer() ≡
let q = alloc(N+2) /* queue = writer index, reader index, buffer */
\[ q + ri \]at := 0;
\[ q + wi \]at := 0;
q

tryProd(q, x) ≡
let w = \[ q + wi \]at
let r = \[ q + ri \]at
let w' = w + 1 mod N
if w' == r then 0
else \[ q + b + w \]na := x;
\[ q + wi \]at := w';
1

tryCons(q) ≡
let w = \[ q + wi \]at
let r = \[ q + ri \]at
if w == r then 0
else let x = \[ q + b + r \]na
\[ q + ri \]at := r + 1 mod N;
x
```

In real implementations, this data structure provides an operation returning a bound on the size of the buffer, which can then be used to efficiently batch a series of reads/writes without checking the indices each time. It would be straightforward to generalize our proof to handle such an operation.

Note also that this data structure exhibits non-SC behavior for essentially the same reasons as the Michael-Scott queue does. (One can construct a similar example to the one given in §D.4.1.)
D.5.3 Proof setup

Top-level spec

{\text{true}} \ \text{newBuffer}() \ \{q, \text{Prod}(q) \ast \text{Cons}(q)\}

{\text{Prod}(q) \ast P(x)} \ \text{tryProd}(q, x) \ \{z. \text{Prod}(q) \ast (z \neq 0 \lor P(x))\}

{\text{Cons}(q)} \ \text{tryCons}(q) \ \{x. \text{Cons}(q) \ast (x = 0 \lor P(x))\}

A ghost PCM for natural numbers

We set up a ghost PCM with carrier $P(N)^4$ with composition $\uplus$ component-wise. We define the following terms over this PCM:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{all} & \triangleq (N, N, N, N) \\
\text{restP}(i) & \triangleq (\{j \mid j > i\}, \{j \mid j \geq i\}, \emptyset, \emptyset) \\
\text{restC}(i) & \triangleq (\emptyset, \emptyset, \{j \mid j > i\}, \{j \mid j \geq i\}) \\
\text{protP}(i) & \triangleq (\{i\}, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset) \\
\text{escP}(i) & \triangleq (\emptyset, \{i\}, \emptyset, \emptyset) \\
\text{protC}(i) & \triangleq (\emptyset, \emptyset, \{i\}, \emptyset) \\
\text{escC}(i) & \triangleq (\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset, \{i\})
\end{align*}
\]

Escrows

We define two escrows, $\text{PE}(\gamma, q, i)$ and $\text{CE}(\gamma, q, i)$, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PE}(\gamma, q, i) & : \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \leadsto \text{uninit}(q + b + (i \mod N)) \lor (q + b + (i \mod N)) \mapsto - \\
\text{CE}(\gamma, q, j) & : \gamma : \text{escC}(j) \leadsto \exists x. P(x) \ast (q + b + (j \mod N)) \mapsto x
\end{align*}
\]

Protocols

We assume STS states for every natural number. We assume two protocols, $\text{PP}(\gamma, q)$ and $\text{CP}(\gamma, q)$ over natural number states, with transition relations

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PP}(\gamma, q)(i, x) & \triangleq \square(x = i \mod N \ast \forall j < i. [\text{CE}(\gamma, q, j)] \ast (\gamma : \text{protP}(i))) \\
\text{CP}(\gamma, q)(j, x) & \triangleq \square(x = j \mod N \ast \forall i < j + N. [\text{PE}(\gamma, q, i)] \ast (\gamma : \text{protC}(j))
\end{align*}
\]

High-level predicates

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Prod}(q) & \triangleq \exists i, j. i < j + N \ast [q + wi : i] \text{PP}(\gamma, q) \ast [q + ri : j] \text{CP}(\gamma, q) \ast (\gamma : \text{restP}(i)) \\
\text{Cons}(q) & \triangleq \exists i, j. j \leq i \ast [q + wi : i] \text{PP}(\gamma, q) \ast [q + ri : j] \text{CP}(\gamma, q) \ast (\gamma : \text{restC}(j))
\end{align*}
\]
D.5.4 Verification of newBuffer

\[
\{ \text{true} \} \\
\{ \exists \gamma. \; [\gamma : \text{all}] \}
\]

let \( q = \text{alloc}(N+2) \)

\[
\{ [\gamma : \text{all}] \star \text{uninit}(q) \star \cdots \star \text{uninit}(q + N + 1) \} \\
\{ \gamma : \text{all} \star \text{uninit}(q) \star \cdots \star \text{uninit}(q + N + 1) \} \\
\{ \gamma : \text{all} \star \text{uninit}(q + wi) \star \text{uninit}(q + ri) \star [\text{PE}(\gamma, q, 0)] \star \cdots \star [\text{PE}(\gamma, q, N - 1)] \}
\]

\[
q + ri \at := 0; \\
\{ q + ri : 0 \; \text{CP}(\gamma, q) \star [\gamma : \text{restC}(0)] \star [\gamma : \text{protP}(0)] \star [\gamma : \text{restP}(0)] \star \text{uninit}(q + wi) \}
\]

\[
q + wi \at := 0; \\
\{ q + ri : 0 \; \text{CP}(\gamma, q) \star q + wi : 0 \; \text{PP}(\gamma, q) \star [\gamma : \text{restC}(0)] \star [\gamma : \text{restP}(0)] \}
\]

\( q \) 

\[
\{ \text{Prod}(q) \star \text{Cons}(q) \}
\]
D.5.5 Verification of \texttt{tryProd}

$$\{ \text{Prod}(q) \ast P(x) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box \left( i < j_0 + N \land q + wi : i \ast i \ast PP(\gamma, q) \land q + ri : j_0 \ast \Box \ast CP(\gamma, q) \right) \}$$

let $w' = [q + wi]_{\text{at}}$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box (w' = i \mod N \land \forall k < i. \left[ CE(\gamma, q, k) \right]) \}$$

let $r = [q + ri]_{\text{at}}$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box (r = j \mod N \land \forall k < j + N. \left[ PE(\gamma, q, k) \right]) \ast \land j_0 \leq j \land \left[ q + ri : j \ast \Box \ast \Box \ast CP(\gamma, q) \right] \}$$

let $w' = w' + 1 \mod N$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box (w' = w + 1 \mod N) \}$$

if $w' = r$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \}$$

0

$$\{ z. \text{Prod}(q) \ast z = 0 \ast P(x) \}$$

else

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box (w' \neq r) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i) \ast P(x) \ast \Box (i + 1 < j + N) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast P(x) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ \gamma : \text{restP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{protP}(i + 1) \ast \Box \ast \gamma : \text{escP}(i) \}$$

$$\{ q + wi \ast i + 1 \ast PP(\gamma, q) \}$$

1

$$\{ z. \text{Prod}(q) \ast z = 1 \}$$
D.5.6 Verification of \texttt{tryCons}

\texttt{Cons(q)}

\begin{align*}
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad \square \left( j \leq i_0 \land q + wi : i_0 PP(\gamma, q) \lor \left[ q + ri : j CP(\gamma, q) \right] \right) \\
\text{let } w = [q + wi]_{at} & \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad \square \left( w = i \mod N \land \forall k < i \left[ CE(\gamma, q, k) \right] \land i_0 \leq i \land \left[ q + wi : i PP(\gamma, q) \right] \right) \\
\text{let } r = [q + ri]_{at} & \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad \square \left( r = j \mod N \land \forall k < j + N \left[ PE(\gamma, q, k) \right] \right) \\
\text{if } w = r \text{ then} & \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad 0 \\
\{ x. \text{Cons}(q) * x = 0 \} \\
\text{else} & \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad w \neq r \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j) \} & \quad \square \left( j < i \right) \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j + 1) \} & \quad \gamma : \text{protC}(j + 1) \quad \gamma : \text{escC}(j) \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j + 1) \} & \quad \gamma : \text{protC}(j + 1) \quad \exists x. P(x) * (q + b + r) \rightarrow x \\
\text{let } x = [q + b + r]_{na} & \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j + 1) \} & \quad \gamma : \text{protC}(j + 1) \quad P(x) * (q + b + r) \rightarrow x \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j + 1) \} & \quad P(x) * \left[ \gamma : \text{protC}(j + 1) \right] [PE(\gamma, q, j + N)] \\
\text{\{ } q + ri \text{\} }_{at} & : = r + 1 \mod N; \\
\{ \gamma : \text{restC}(j + 1) \} & \quad P(x) * [q + ri : j + 1 CP(\gamma, q)] \\
\{ x. \text{Cons}(q) * P(x) \}
\end{align*}
D.6 Bounded ticket locks

D.6.1 Parameters

- Fix some resource invariant \( P \) to be protected by the lock.
- \( C \) is a constant representing the maximum unsigned integer value of the machine.
  
  \( \text{FAI} \) increments modulo \( C \) (see the semantics of the language in Appendix §A.2).

Let \( \text{ns} = 0 \), \( \text{tc} = 1 \). We will use these values as field offsets.

D.6.2 Code

```plaintext
newLock() ≜
  let \( x = \text{alloc}(2) \)
  \( [x + \text{ns}]_{\text{at}} := 0; \)
  \( [x + \text{tc}]_{\text{at}} := 0; \)
  \( x \)

lock(\( x \)) ≜
  let \( y = \text{FAI}(x + \text{tc}) \)
  repeat
    let \( z = [x + \text{ns}]_{\text{at}} \)
    \( y \equiv z \)
  end

unlock(\( x \)) ≜
  let \( z = [x + \text{ns}]_{\text{at}} \)
  \( [x + \text{ns}]_{\text{at}} := (z + 1) \mod C \)
```

Ticket locks [10] are a fair locking mechanism employed by the Linux kernel. The data structure involves two atomic locations, one \((x + \text{tc})\) storing a “ticket” counter, and the other \((x + \text{ns})\) a “now-serving” counter. Both are initially 0. To acquire the lock, a thread first atomically obtains the current value \( t \) of the ticket counter and increments it (using a fetch-and-add), and then spins until the now-serving counter is equal to the “ticket” \( t \) that it received. To release the lock, the thread just increments the now-serving counter to \( t + 1 \).

Ticket locks rely crucially on the invariant that no two threads trying to acquire the lock at the same time have the same ticket. If the ticket counter is modeled as an unbounded natural number, this invariant is easy to ensure. But in reality, ticket counters are bounded by the maximum unsigned integer value \( C \) of a machine word, and they wrap around to 0 once hitting \( C - 1 \). Ticket locks thus only behave correctly if the number of threads concurrently trying to acquire the lock is at most \( C \).

We have proven correctness for an implementation of bounded ticket locks, where the updates to the ticket counter are performed using a physically atomic fetch-and-increment operation \( \text{FAI} \), but the reads and writes to the now-serving counter are release-acquire. By arranging for the acquire operation to consume a \text{MayAcquire} permission, and by only giving the client a fixed budget of \( C \) such permissions, our spec restricts the client from spawning more than \( C \) threads to acquire the lock at one time. While similar in certain ways to the proof of the circular buffer, the proof of bounded ticket locks is surprisingly subtle and employs a somewhat more elaborate ghost PCM. It also relies on the following “frame-preserving update” rule for ghost moves, which we have proven sound:

\[
\forall t_F : \text{PCM}_\mu, t_1 \#_{t_F} t_2 \Rightarrow t_2 \#_{t_F} t_3
\]

This rule, familiar from recent work on separation logic [14, 22, 25], enables one to make an arbitrary update to one’s ghost resource, so long as the update is guaranteed to preserve compatibility with arbitrary frame resources. It is used in the proof of the (UseUnPerm) and (GetTicket) axioms below.

To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of correctness for bounded ticket locks in a weak memory setting.
D.6.3 Proof setup

Top-level spec

\begin{align*}
\{P\} \text{newLock}() & \{ x. \bigstar_{t < C} \text{MayAcquire}(x) \} \\
\{ \text{MayAcquire}(x) \} \\text{lock}(x) & \{ P * \text{MayRelease}(x) \} \\
\{ P * \text{MayRelease} \} \\text{unlock}(x) & \{ \text{MayAcquire}(x) \}
\end{align*}

Default sorts of variables

- $t, n$ range over $\mathbb{N}$.
- $i, j$ range over $\text{Ids} = \{0, \ldots, C - 1\}$, where $C$ is the word size (the modulus of FAI).
- $T$ ranges over $\mathbb{P} \{ \mathbb{N} \}$.
- $M$ ranges over $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Ids}$ such that $\exists t. \text{dom}(M) = \{ t' | t' < t \}$.
- $I$ ranges over $\text{Ids} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$.

Abstract predicates For purposes of modularity, we give the following axioms about a set of abstract ghost predicates, which are all you need in order to do the proof. Later on, we will show that these predicates are implementable (and axioms satisfiable) in terms of a suitable ghost PCM.

- $\text{Perms}^\gamma_2(t) \Rightarrow \text{LkPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{Perms}^\gamma_2(t + 1)$ (GetPerms)
- $\text{LkPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{LkPerm}^\gamma(t) \Rightarrow \bot$ (LkPermExclusive)
- $\text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(t) * \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t') \Rightarrow t \leq t'$ (UnusedUnPerms)
- $\text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(t) * \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \Rightarrow \text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(t + 1)$ (UseUnPerm)
- $\text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(t) \Rightarrow \Box(\text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(t))$ (UnusedPermsPure)
- $\text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T) * \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(M) \Rightarrow (\forall t. M(t) = i \iff t \in T)$ (MyAllCoherence)
- $\text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T) * \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(M) * t = |\text{dom}(M)| \Rightarrow \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \cup \{t\}) * \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(M \cup \{t \mapsto i\})$ (GetTicket)
- $\text{true} \Rightarrow \exists \gamma. \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(\emptyset) \left( \bigstar_{t < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, \emptyset) \right) * \text{Perms}^\gamma_2(0) * \text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(0)$ (NewGhost)

Escrows We define one resource escrow $\text{Esc}^\gamma(n)$, which is used to pass control over the lock-protected resource from the lock-releaser to the next lock-acquirer (with ticket $n$).

$$\text{Esc}^\gamma(n) : \text{LkPerm}^\gamma(n) \leadsto P$$

Protocols The protocol $\text{NSP}^\gamma(n)$ describes a protocol on the now-serving counter $x + ns$, with states for every natural number $n$ and the usual ordering ($\leq$) on states. Here, $n$ represents the “absolute” value of the counter, as opposed to the actual value, which is $n \mod C$.

$$\text{NSP}^\gamma(n, z) \triangleq \Box(z = n \mod C * \text{UsedUP}^\gamma_2(n) * |\text{Esc}^\gamma(n)|)$$

The protocol $\text{TCP}^\gamma(x, y)$ describes an invariant protocol on the ticket counter $x + tc$, with single state $\text{Inv}$.

$$\text{TCP}^\gamma(x, y)(\text{Inv}, y) \triangleq \exists t, n, M. (t = |\text{dom}(M)|) * (y = t \mod C) * (t \leq n + C) * \left( x + ns : n | \text{NSP}^\gamma \right) * (\forall t_1 < t_2 < t. M(t_1) = M(t_2) \Rightarrow t_1 < n) * \text{Perms}^\gamma_2(t) * \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(M)$$

Derived predicates Here are some useful predicates defined in terms of the above predicates.

- $\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T) \triangleq \left[ x + tc : \text{Inv} \bigstar \text{TCP}^\gamma(x, x) \right] * \forall t \in T. (x + ns : t + 1 | \text{NSP}^\gamma)$
- $\text{HoldingTkt}^\gamma(i, T) \triangleq \text{LkPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \cup \{t\})$
- $\text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, T) \triangleq \Box(\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T)) * \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T)$
- $\text{MayRelease}^\gamma(x, i, T) \triangleq \Box(\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T)) * \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \cup \{t\}) * \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) * \text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, T)$
- $\text{MayAcquire}(x) \triangleq \exists \gamma, i, T. \text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, T)$
- $\text{MayRelease}(x) \triangleq \exists \gamma, i, T, \text{MayRelease}^\gamma(x, i, T, t)$

52
D.6.4 Verification of newLock

\[
\{ P \} \\
\{ P \ast \exists \gamma. \text{UsedUP}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{Perms}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(0) \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

let \( x = \text{alloc}(2) \)

\[
\{ P \ast \text{uninit}(x + \text{ns}) \ast \text{uninit}(x + \text{tc}) \ast \text{UsedUP}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{Perms}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(0) \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

\[
\{ \text{Esc}(\gamma, 0) \ast \text{UsedUP}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{uninit}(x + \text{ns}) \ast \text{uninit}(x + \text{tc}) \ast \text{Perms}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(0) \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

\[
[x + \text{ns}]_{\text{at}} := 0;
\]

\[
\{ x + \text{ns} : 0 \} \ast \text{uninit}(x + \text{tc}) \ast \text{Perms}_{\leq}(0) \ast \text{AllTkts}^\gamma(0) \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

\[
[x + \text{tc}]_{\text{at}} := 0;
\]

\[
\{ x + \text{tc} : \text{Inv} \} \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

\[
\Box(\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, 0)) \ast \left( \bullet_{i < C} \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, 0) \right) \}
\]

\[
\{ \bullet_{i < C} \text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, 0) \}
\]

\[
\{ \bullet_{i < C} \text{MayAcquire}(x) \}
\]
D.6.5 Verification of lock

\{ \text{MayAcquire}(x) \}
\{ \exists \gamma, i, T. \text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, T) \}
\{ \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T) \ast \Box(\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T)) \}
\{ \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T) \ast \frac{x + tc}{\text{TCP}(\gamma, x)} \ast \forall t \in T. \frac{x + ns}{t + 1} \Box \text{NSP}^\gamma \}

let \( y = \text{FAI}(x + tc) \)
\{ \exists t, n_0. \Box (y = t \mod C) \ast (t < n_0 + C) \ast \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t) \}

repeat

let \( z = \frac{x + ns}{\text{at}} \)
\{ \exists n. \Box (\frac{x + ns}{n} \Box \text{NSP}^\gamma) \ast (z = n \mod C) \ast (n \geq n_0) \ast \text{UsedUP}_\gamma^\gamma(n) \ast \left[ \text{Esc}(\gamma, n) \right] \ast \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t) \}
\{ y = z \}
\{ (b = 0 \ast \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t)) \lor (b = 1 \ast \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t) \ast (t \mod C = n \mod C)) \}

end
\{ \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t) \ast (t \mod C = n \mod C) \}
\{ \text{HoldingTkts}^\gamma(i, T, t) \ast \Box (t = n) \}
\{ \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \ast \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \ast \text{LkPerm}^\gamma(t) \ast \left[ \text{Esc}(\gamma, t) \right] \}
\{ P \ast \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \ast \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \}
\{ P \ast \text{MayRelease}^\gamma(x, i, T, t) \}
\{ P \ast \text{MayRelease}(x) \}

D.6.6 Verification of unlock

\{ P \ast \text{MayRelease}(x) \}
\{ P \ast \exists \gamma, i, T, t. \text{MayRelease}^\gamma(x, i, T, t) \}
\{ P \ast \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \ast \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \ast \Box \left( \text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T) \ast \frac{x + ns}{t} \Box \text{NSP}^\gamma \right) \}

let \( z = \frac{x + ns}{\text{at}} \)
\{ P \ast \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \ast \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \ast \Box (z = t \mod C \ast \text{UsedUP}_\gamma^\gamma(t)) \}
\{ \left[ \text{Esc}(\gamma, t + 1) \right] \ast \text{UnPerm}^\gamma(t) \ast \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \}
\{ x + ns \ast :) = (z + 1) \mod C \}
\{ x + ns : t + 1 \Box \text{NSP}^\gamma \ast \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \}
\{ \Box (\text{UsedTkts}^\gamma(x, T \uplus \{t\})) \ast \Box \text{MyTkts}^\gamma(i, T \uplus \{t\}) \}
\{ \text{MayAcquire}^\gamma(x, i, T \uplus \{t\}) \}
\{ \text{MayAcquire}(x) \}

54
D.6.7 Substantiating the axioms about the abstract predicates

Here we define the abstract predicates that we used in the above proof in terms of a suitable ghost PCM. It is easy to check that the axioms about these predicates that we used are sound w.r.t. the PCM. In the case of the ghost “transition” axioms (UseUnPerm) and (GetTicket), i.e., where there is a “state change” (using up an unlock permission, or assigning the next ticket to a particular index $i$), the soundness of the axiom relies on the frame-preserving ghost update rule. For the ghost allocation axiom (NewGhost), soundness follows from the ghost allocation rule.

The ghost PCM is a Cartesian product of three sub-PCMs:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ticket Allocations } & \mathcal{T} ::= \text{My}(\mathcal{I}) \quad \text{All}(\mathcal{I}, M) \quad \forall t. \forall i \in \text{dom}(\mathcal{I}). t \in \mathcal{I}(i) \iff i = M(t) \\
\text{Lock Permissions } & \mathcal{L} ::= L \quad L \subseteq \mathbb{N} \\
\text{Unlock Permissions } & \mathcal{U} ::= (U, n) \quad U \subseteq \mathbb{N} \land \forall t \in U. t \geq n
\end{align*}
\]

A ticket allocation is either My($\mathcal{I}$)—which asserts the right to lock for the indices in dom($\mathcal{I}$), as well as the knowledge of all tickets allocated to those indices ($\mathcal{I}$ itself)—or else All($\mathcal{I}$, $M$), which asserts the right to lock for the indices in dom($\mathcal{I}$), as well as the knowledge of all tickets allocated so far. There is a side condition on well-definedness of All($\mathcal{I}$, $M$) insisting that $\mathcal{I}$ and $M$ are coherent.

The unit of the ticket allocation monoid is My($\emptyset$). Composition is defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{My}(\mathcal{I}_1) \cdot \text{My}(\mathcal{I}_2) & \triangleq \text{My}(\mathcal{I}_1 \cup \mathcal{I}_2) \\
\text{My}(\mathcal{I}_1) \cdot \text{All}(\mathcal{I}_2, M) & \triangleq \text{All}(\mathcal{I}_1 \cup \mathcal{I}_2, M) \quad \text{if that is well-defined} \\
\text{All}(\mathcal{I}_1, M) \cdot \text{My}(\mathcal{I}_2) & \triangleq \text{All}(\mathcal{I}_1 \cup \mathcal{I}_2, M) \quad \text{if that is well-defined}
\end{align*}
\]

Lock permissions are the usual powerset monoid with disjoint union as composition and $\emptyset$ as unit. The set $L$ represents the set of lock permissions one holds.

Unlock permissions $(U, n)$ are similar, except that here we have the possibility of using a ticket up, after which point the “knowledge” that it is used up becomes a boxable (permanently true) assertion. The $U$ represents the set of unlock permissions one holds, while $n$ represents a lower bound on the unlock permissions that anyone can hold. (All unlock permissions less than $n$ are to be viewed as “used up”.) The side condition on well-definedness of monoid elements enforces that one cannot own an unlock permission that one knows has already been used up.

The unit of the monoid is $(\emptyset, 0)$. Composition is defined as follows:

\[
(U_1, n_1) \cdot (U_2, n_2) \triangleq (U_1 \cup U_2, \max(n_1, n_2)) \quad \text{if that is well-defined}
\]

We are now ready to define the abstract predicates used in the proof:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Perms}_{\leq}(i) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{My}(0), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0)) \\
\text{LkPerm}_{\leq}(i) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{My}(0), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0)) \\
\text{UnPerm}_{\leq}(i) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{My}(0), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0)) \\
\text{UsedUP}_{\leq}(i) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{My}(0), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0)) \\
\text{MyTkts}_{\leq}(i, T) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{My}([i \mapsto T]), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0)) \\
\text{AllTkts}_{\leq}(M) & \triangleq \gamma : (\text{All}(0, M), \mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : (\mathcal{I}_i \geq 0 : 0))
\end{align*}
\]